18.08.2025


The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine published information on the War&Sanctions portal that Russian enterprises engaged in the production of Kh-59 missiles are experiencing difficulties due to sanctions. In particular, 50 companies out of 116 cannot provide products for the production of these missiles in a timely manner. And this fully explains the reasons why the Russian occupation forces began to use such ersatz missiles as “Dan-M” and “Banderol”.
More details about this can be found in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance” .
Kh-59 missiles: from Chechnya to Ukraine
The Kh-59 “Ovod” medium-range aviation missile was developed in 1975 and adopted for service in 1980.
Its main carrier was initially the Su-17, and after their decommissioning, the Su-24. Now – the Su-25, Su-27, Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35.
The range of the X-59 targets is up to 115 km, but there are modifications with a range of 200 and 290 km. However, these modifications are associated with the use of high-tech components, the production of which is complicated.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that during the war in Chechnya, the Kh-59 missiles demonstrated extremely mediocre accuracy of strikes, critically dependent on weather conditions and terrain features. However, it was one of the main medium-range aircraft missiles in service with the Russian aviation, which was also later regularly used for strikes on the territory of Ukraine.

Regarding the information that Russian manufacturers have a shortage of domestic and foreign component base, which even led to “cannibalism” of old systems – dismantling of old P95 engines and homing head components, which is confirmed by the intensive attempts of the Russian occupation forces to replace the Kh-59 with cheaper means of destruction . And these were “Dan-M” and “Banderol”.
“Dan-M” and “Banderol”
These weapons began to be actively used by the Russian occupiers since the beginning of 2025. And the first signs of their functionality spoke of a clear similarity with the Kh-59/69 and an attempt to replace these aircraft missiles.
For example, the “Banderol” was a means of destruction with a cruising speed of around 600 km/h, but with a maximum of about 700 km/h. The flight range of the “Banderol” rarely exceeded 200 km, and it was launched from the “Orion” UAV. In the future, the possibility of launches from the Mi-28 and Mi-8 was also considered.
The Banderola was also equipped with B-101 flight control units and Comet navigation modules in combination with the B-105 satellite navigation unit. Exactly the same units are installed on the Orlan-10, Forpost-P UAVs, as well as on some modifications of the Shahed-136.
It is also known that this weapon was equipped with eight antennas, which increased resistance to electronic warfare suppression, and the presence of an inertial navigation system and a means of measuring telemetric indicators increased the accuracy of targeting.
“Dan-M” is generally an air target, not some new product created from scratch – even if it is as artisanal and cheap as “Banderol”.
The characteristics and improvements are practically the same as those of the “Banderola” – with the difference that it is a ready-made, serial product with the ability to launch not only from a land launch site, but also from an air carrier – a Mi-8 helicopter.
All these weapons are what are called mobilization missiles – the possibility of rapid, mass production with neglect of quality, as well as the perfection of technical and technological processes. While not being full-fledged missiles, they became the first ersatz substitutes for expensive and labor-intensive to produce classic aircraft missiles.
And now it is generally clear what this is connected with. Not just with an attempt to reduce the cost of weapons and diversify the range, but with real problems during production, when instead of active radar homing heads (ARGSN), large-sized mock-ups were installed on the missile – with all the consequences that follow from this.
Conclusions
Enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex are experiencing serious difficulties in the production of high-tech products and are trying to replace them with artisanal, mobilization-type analogues. So far, this has not brought significant or even desired results, but this is not a reason to relax.
It is obvious that under sanctions and difficulties in the production of certain weapons, in this case, the Kh-59/69 missiles, Russia is looking for ways to simplify and reduce the cost of these processes. And this may lead to the scaling up of the production of ersatz missiles in the foreseeable future.
Under such conditions, the search for ways to counter cheap Russian means of terror by creating and producing even cheaper, but effective and mass-produced means of interception becomes even more urgent.
Gradually, but this is exactly the phase of this war that we are entering – cheapness and mass production are becoming key parameters for achieving high efficiency.

“…the Kh-59 missiles demonstrated extremely mediocre accuracy of strikes…”
The cockroaches don’t need high accuracy. A city is large enough to strike accurately. Any hospitals, schools, apartment buildings, shopping centers, or kindergartens in the way don’t matter to the war criminals. On the contrary .. so much the better for them.
As we see, some sanctions do have an effect on the ability for the war criminals to wage war. However, just recently, the White House stated that sanctions are IN THE WAY to a peace deal. It was Rubio who said it. Clearly, there is not a single member of taco’s administration who is not severely mentally handicapped.