12.08.2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP
The hastily assembled and disjointed group of Russian troops responding to the Ukrainian
operation in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation consists of units whose numbers are below the doctrinally defined ones. Also, the Russian brigades are ill-prepared to create the unified command and control structures necessary to coordinate the response.
This is stated in a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Analysts noted that Russian propagandists themselves predict that the Russian army is weak in defending itself on its own territory.
Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets reported on August 11 that the Russian Armed Forces have so far redeployed approximately 10-11 battalions from across the Ukrainian front to Kursk. But he suggested that these units are not up to their intended final strength, which is likely to further disorganize the Russian response to the operation.
According to him, the aggressor transferred a reinforced motorized rifle battalion of the 138th motorized rifle brigade (6th combined arms army, Leningrad military district) and up to three battalions from the 128th motorized rifle brigade and 72nd motorized rifle division (both from the 44th army corps, Leningrad military district) to defend the Kursk border area. These two formations from the Northern Group of Forces operated in the north of the Kharkov region. In addition, one motorized rifle battalion of the 272nd regiment (47th tank division, 1st tank army of the Moscow military district) was transferred to Kursk from the Kupyansk direction. Up to two airborne (VDV) battalions of the 217th VDV regiment (98th division) from the Kursk region; units of an unspecified echelon of the 104th VDV division from the Kherson region; one battalion, possibly from the 810th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation from the Kherson direction, which most likely belongs to the 155th Marine Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), which operated in the north of the Kharkov region. Additional battalions of the occupiers from the 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both from the 35th Army, Eastern Military District) also went to defend Kursk, probably from the Zaporizhzhya direction.
“Mashovets’ report largely agrees with another Ukrainian source’s report from August 9 and contradicts widespread statements by Russian military bloggers from August 10 and 11 that units of the 810th Marine Brigade are fighting in the Sudzha and Martynovka area,” ISW analysts noted.
They estimate that Russia’s redeployment of battalions and lower-level units, rather than full brigades and regiments, to defend the Kursk region contributes to the difficulties of Russian forces in quickly establishing effective command in the area. The Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will be redeploying battalions across the front lines, which are often at the reinforced company level due to a lack of resources, including newly created units that are not fully staffed.
Frontelligence Insight also noted that UAV units are often deployed separately from their main force due to their greater mobility and combat effectiveness, and therefore the observation of drone activity in any given combat area does not necessarily mean that the main force of a given formation is operating nearby.
However, the disorganization of the regular Russian battalions, combined with Russia’s decision to hand over the defense of the Kursk region to the FSB rather than the Defense Ministry, as well as the integration of conscripts, security forces from the FSB and the Russian National Guard into these battles, will hinder the Kremlin’s efforts to create an effective frontline command on Russian territory.
Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are likely trying to buy time for a further, more comprehensive redeployment of forces to defend the Kursk region and are focusing on minimizing Ukrainian offensive efforts rather than creating a joint command structure. A well-known Kremlin-awarded Russian blogger recently stated that Russian forces in the Kursk region are experiencing difficulties in communicating with each other and often do not know the units operating on their flanks. All this is happening due to the rapid redeployment of occupiers from different troop groupings, which ultimately undermines the integrity of Russian defensive lines both in Russia and on the front in Ukraine.
As reported by OBOZ.UA, a video from the first days of the operation in the Kursk region of Russia was published online. At that time, at least 29 Russian soldiers were captured.
Later, a video appeared showing several dozen more Russian Armed Forces soldiers captured near Kursk. Among them were many mercenaries from the Chechen special forces unit “Akhmat”.
Ruskie potato generals are not known to be farsighted, flexible, or very smart. The type of response they are displaying in Kursk underline these facts.