If you believe Russia’s state agency…

MAY 1, 2023

Russia’s T-14 Armata—an alleged super tank that was the star of Kremlin propaganda circa-2014—has finally joined battle in Ukraine, if you believe reports from Russia’s RIA state media agency.

A decade ago, Moscow claimed it would field 2,300 T-14s by 2020, though all that has been visible to date are a few dozen prototypes reportedly totaling 40 by 2021. Though a fixture at Moscow parades for many years, these notably played no role in Russia’s massively costly new invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022 and has, by April of 2023, resulted in at least 1,900 Russian tanks destroyed, abandoned or damaged. This has forced Russia to reactivate obsolete T-54 and T-62 tanks.

Rumors that Russia was finally going to send T-14s into combat began increasing in January-February of 2023, though visual evidence remained elusive.

Now, Russian state media asserts that the new tanks have begun providing fire support from a short distance behind the frontline, but have not been used to push forward towards Ukrainian positions in “direct assaults” where risk of loss would be much higher.

These T-14s were reportedly also up-armored with additional side and, possibly, top armor—perhaps a reference to some form of ‘cope cage’ intended to protect against grenade-armed drones and (less promisingly) Javelin top-attack missiles.

The new T-14 claim, though from official sources, should still be treated with caution as it lacks confirming visual evidence. There may be an incentive to claim T-14s are in combat for a bump in reputation without having to risk losing them. But, on another level, it’s arguably surprising that it’s taken even this long for a combat test to materialize.

Not a game-changer

Before we delve into the T-14’s advancements, let’s get one thing clear—Russia has built so few T-14s that combat-testing some in Ukraine cannot impact the overall course of the war.

That’s not a comment on the T-14’s capability, or lack thereof. It’s simply meant to state that, despite what your favorite fiction might suggest, battles and wars can’t be won by a small handful of wonder weapons.

To put it in perspective, Ukraine is receiving several hundred highly capable Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles—and even then, Western military analysts fear that the quantity may not be enough to be decisive.

Russia likely hopes that combat testing the T-14 will boost morale, shore up the design’s faltering reputation, and perhaps provide valuable insight into the type’s strengths and weaknesses—insights which can be used to tweak an eventual series production model. That could inform Russia’s tank procurement decisions in the mid- to long-term, which have focused on producing the interim T-90M tank rather than the T-14.

But such a move has risks, too. Because T-14s are so few and the design has yet to enter regular operational service, the type will likely impose a high logistical burden in the field due to unique maintenance, training requirements, and the risk of frequent breakdowns. A British military report claimed reliability issues were serious enough that Russian commanders “…are unlikely to trust the vehicle in combat.”

And should Russia lose a T-14 to Ukrainian fire, the damage to the country’s military reputation would be considerable after years of hype.

Russia’s military is allegedly minimizing that risk by deploying the T-14s for fire support, as opposed to offensive maneuvers where they would be exposed to short-range anti-tank weapons and flanking attacks. Any direct fire attacks at a T-14, then, would likely come from head-on, where the tank has the best odds of surviving.

It’s even possible they’re being used as artillery deployed even further behind the frontline—though that would be a wasteful use of gun barrels designed for high-velocity direct fire.

Ukrainian forces would likely make a special effort to destroy T-14s if their presence were detected in a sector. Already, Ukraine’s troops have managed to disable even T-90M tanks with anti-tank grenades dropped by overflying commercial drones. The T-14’s new sensors and defenses don’t appear configured to detect and defeat threats from directly above.

There will also be the risk that T-14s undergoing maintenance/repairs could be abandoned should Russian forces be abruptly compelled to retreat in response to a Ukrainian offensive. During World War II, Nazi Germany lost many of its vaunted Tiger and King Tiger heavy tanks when it had to abandon broken-down or fuel-exhausted vehicles while retreating.

What’s new in the T-14?

On paper, the T-14’s biggest innovations relate to defense and survivability, crowned by its avant-garde crew-less turret. This allows maximized kinetic armor protection for the crew in the hull, supposedly peaking at around 1 or 1.1 meters RHA equivalent versus kinetic attacks. Though the T-14 stores shells in a carousel auto-loader in the turret like prior Russian tanks, the separate hull compartment may reduce risk to the crew in event of a turret ‘pop’ when a hit causes ammo to combust.

It’s possible that the turret itself may be only lightly armored to save weight and focus on crew protection. That might make disabling a T-14’s offensive capability (a “mission kill”) not very difficult, even if harming the crew is. The unmanned turret does also mean that the crew is heavily reliant on external cameras for situational awareness.

The other big defensive upgrade on the T-14 is its Afghanit active protection system—which includes radars that detect an incoming projectile and dispensers that automatically launch a counter charge to shoot down, or at least degrade, the incoming munition. While the T-14 isn’t the first Russian/Soviet tank with a hard-kill APS, if it works better than predecessors, it could greatly reduce the effectiveness of long-distance anti-tank guided missiles approaching from the covered arcs. However, the radar and charges don’t appear angled to defeat near vertical attacks, like a plunging Javelin missile or an overflying drone.

Additionally, between the Afghanit and the T-14’s steel-ceramic composite armor is a layer of next-generation explosive reactive armor called Malachite. Unlike most predecessors, Afghanit and Malachite supposedly can help degrade even kinetic anti-tank shells, not just HEAT munitions using shaped charges. Other defenses include infrared signature minimization, technology to increase mine resilience, and laser warning receiver.

Due to its lighter weight, the T-14 is meant to be faster than most Western tanks at 50 miles per hour.

On the offensive side of things, the T-14 also has a new 2A82 125-millimeter gun with a higher muzzle velocity than the 2A46 on most Russian tanks. Its loader can, furthermore, employ air-bursting Telnik fragmentation rounds (used against infantry) and high-performance tungsten or depleted-uranium Vacuum anti-tank shells, unlike its predecessors. To engage distant targets or helicopter, the gun can also launch the 3UBK21 Sprinter anti-tank missile out to a range of 5 miles.

YURI KADOBNOV//Getty Images

Both Vacuum and Sprinter seem like they should be effective against Western main battle tanks on paper, but Russia’s ability to produce and field these new munitions in quantity is unclear. The firepower boost could matter, should T-14s ever engage heavily armored Western-supplied Leopard 2 or M1 tanks in Ukraine. But, realistically, tank duels remain relatively rare (though not unheard of) in Ukraine.

More important are the sights and fire control system, which include both a gunner and commander’s independent sights with 4x and 12x magnification. These allegedly can detect tanks 4.6 miles away during the day, or 2.2 miles at night. However, Russia’s most modernized tanks formerly relied on thermal sensors sourced from France for its best tank, and there is reason to doubt its indigenous substitutes (notably the PNM-T sight) are of equal quality.

While the T-14, in principle, promises an upgrade to Russia’s combat capabilities, the fact that it has languished so long without entering full-scale production hints at a combination of persistent teething issues, production challenges perhaps related to importing sanctioned microelectronic components and, above all, higher cost than Russia has been willing to shell out per tank.

Reports suggest that each T-14 may cost up to $5 million or more to produce. That’s not bad compared to modern Western tank prices, but it’s a tough swallow for Russia. How the T-14’s combat trials proceed in Ukraine (if they are even substantively occurring) may help Russia decide whether to boost production of the T-14, or if the type will remain the relic of a military modernization effort which became unaffordable after the onset of the first wave of Western sanctions in 2014.

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a43699729/russia-claims-t14-armata-tanks-began-combat-tests-ukraine/