18.11.2025
The advance of the Russian occupation army in the Pokrovska and Myrnograd area is minimal, despite the enormous resources that the enemy has thrown into this priority area. Moreover, de facto this agglomeration is a magnet that holds back the enemy’s forces and means, which could be transferred to other areas of the front in the event of the capture of these two cities. Therefore, despite all the complexity of the situation for the Ukrainian Defense Forces, they have not yet been able to leave this “pocket”.
As for Mirnograd, analyzing the enemy’s actions, we can conclude that he may be preparing a large-scale assault on the city using armored vehicles. To do this, he is actively demining paved roads to the east of the city. Infiltration has become the main tactical technique not only of the Russian Federation, but also of the Defense Forces, thanks to which pockets have appeared in the combat zone where the occupiers are completely surrounded. However, the main advantage of the enemy army remains its huge human resource.
This opinion was expressed by military expert Vladislav Seleznyov in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.
– The first question is about the situation in Pokrovsk. In your opinion, is there still a chance to retain control over the city?
– First of all, I am not a supporter of supporting an information wave that would instill illusions in Ukrainian society. In fact, the situation in the Pokrovska and Myrnograd areas is extremely difficult. But the peculiarity of the events that are currently taking place there is that, despite the huge amount of resources spent by the enemy, his advance here is minimal.
Yes, of course, the trends are quite obvious: the enemy continues to tighten the pincers of the operational semi-encirclement, continues to infiltrate its manpower, the same stormtroopers, both in Pokrovsk and in Mirnograd, but the Ukrainian garrison is holding on. It is holding on due to the fact that we continue to hold positions in the Rodynske area and in the Hryshynye area, thereby preventing the Russians from closing the pincers of the operational semi-encirclement, respectively, being able to provide logistics for our garrison operating there.
The trends are quite complex. It is obvious that in the near future we will see maneuver defense by Ukrainian forces and means, primarily airborne assault units, which will somewhat shorten the contact lines there. It is quite possible that we will see the withdrawal of our forces and means to other lines and positions in Myrnograd itself, which will allow us to redirect some of the freed resources to hold the “throat” leading to the Pokrovsko-Myrnograd agglomeration.
We observed a similar scenario during the battles in the Bakhmut and Vugledar areas. There, too, the enemy gradually tightened the pincers of the semi-encirclement around our garrison. How the situation will develop this time is difficult to predict. The President states that he is not a supporter of the battle for the ruins of cities, and the highest value for us is the lives of Ukrainian servicemen.
Let the military decide how to proceed – either to defend Pokrovska and Myrnograd, or to conduct certain maneuvering actions with a withdrawal to other lines and positions, avoiding the operational encirclement of our forces and means. Of course, I do not know what decision will be made. And, most likely, a certain information pause will be maintained regarding military and war-related resources in order not to create problems for our forces and means during these measures.
In any case, it would be unprofessional to entertain the illusion that the Armed Forces of Ukraine can hold our positions in Pokrovsk and Myrnograd for quite a long time.
Everything south of the railway in Pokrovsk is effectively a gray zone where the Russians have the upper hand. Everything north of the railway in Pokrovsk is a gray zone where the Ukrainian Defense Forces have the upper hand. They conduct search and raid operations, find and destroy Russian attack aircraft.
But, unlike us, the enemy has quite large human resources and continues to add new ones to replace those who escaped, were eliminated, and were wounded Russian stormtroopers within the framework of the infiltration of small and very small stormtrooper groups. The same processes are gradually beginning in the Myrnograd area. Plus, the enemy is now actively demining the hard-surfaced roads located east of Myrnograd.
Most likely, the enemy is preparing measures with the participation of armored vehicles to conduct a large-scale assault on this settlement. Therefore, everything will depend on what forces and means the enemy will use to storm these settlements, to try to close the ring of semi-encirclement. And, accordingly, what forces and means the Ukrainian General Staff will have to each time strengthen our garrisons operating on this sector of the front.
The role of Pokrovska and Mirnograd is difficult to overestimate. Of course, the concentration in one place of a huge number of Russian resources, estimated at 110, 150 and even 170 thousand, is a good magnet that diverts a huge number of Russian resources to one section of the front. If our intelligence claims that currently approximately 650 thousand Russian servicemen are involved within the so-called SVO, then practically 150 thousand is a little less than a quarter. But this quarter is concentrated on a relatively small section of the front. And this means that the enemy does not have the opportunity to maneuver forces and means.
But we still have a number of problem areas of the front. Let’s imagine that the enemy is now solving operational-tactical tasks in Pokrovsk and Mirnograd by occupying them. So, he has the opportunity to free up resources and send them to the Liman direction, where we have a rather difficult situation, taking into account the enemy’s attempts to advance to the Sloviansk-Izyum highway within the framework of a “creeping offensive”. The DeepState map is very eloquent in this regard.
We have a rather difficult situation in the area of Kupyansk and Kupyansk Vuzlovye, where the enemy continues to carry out infiltration measures inside the settlement, as well as to put pressure on our defenders on the left or eastern bank of the Oskil River, reducing our bridgehead there. The situation is quite difficult in the east and south of the Zaporizhia region. This has been discussed many times. Therefore, the enemy definitely has a place to apply its resources, which were released in the area of Pokrovsk and Myrnograd.
But will we have time to reflect on these movements and will we be fully prepared to repel enemy attacks? It is difficult to say. In any case, we must understand: even though the autumn-winter campaign involves a certain “freezing of the front”, this has not happened this year. The enemy, on the contrary, is trying to secretly concentrate its efforts in certain directions under the cover of rain and fog. And we do not always see these preparations due to the fact that the use of reconnaissance drones is partially limited due to fog and rain.
– You mentioned the word “infiltration” several times. Indeed, if you just look at the map of the fighting, you can see its signs – constant attempts by the enemy to infiltrate in small groups, small forces deep into our defense. Now, for example, in Kupyansk, we see a similar situation. Don’t you think that the Defense Forces could also use the same tactics of infiltration deep into the enemy’s positions? If so, why don’t they do it?
– The fact is that such measures are being taken. If we are talking about Pokrovsk, then the northern part of this settlement is a solid gray zone, but there are pockets of Russian resistance there. That is, the de facto occupiers are completely surrounded, and their support is carried out either by air or somehow covertly, by small groups of servicemen who, under cover of night, try to break through to their own and bring everything they need: food, ammunition. Some Ukrainian units operating south of the railway in Pokrovsk also find themselves in a similar situation, being literally completely surrounded, conducting defensive actions at 360 degrees.
That is, in principle, we also implement such options in terms of infiltration, but Russian human resources and our capabilities are incomparable. Researchers and a number of Ukrainian servicemen say that on the priority areas of the front for the Russian army, there is a multiple advantage of the enemy, which reaches the figures of 14-18 servicemen per one Ukrainian fighter.
Obviously, in such conditions, it is extremely difficult to talk about the readiness to actively use small group infiltration tactics, because the lion’s share of these attack aircraft will forever remain in the fields. We find and destroy them either by dropping them from drones or FPV drones, plus we actively mine certain areas of the front.
So, I think the Ukrainian army is carrying out some episodes of infiltration. But it’s not worth talking about this as a large-scale event because we don’t have enough or comparable personnel to the Russians.
Bleak.
The defenders need serious firepower and serious manpower in double-quick time, as well as much more by way of air defence.
The “allies” response as always is to give 20% of what is needed in terms of firepower and 0% in terms of manpower and air power.
As opposed to Krasnov, who is fulfilling his election promise to give 0% to Ukraine while rimming his bum chum.
How evil is promising big business opportunities to a child-murderer?
Of all the negatives about Taco, it is Europe that angers me at least as much as he does. It is Europe, after all, that is directly threatened and, concurrently, protected by Ukraine. Yet, as you stated, not a single dammed boot is on the ground, nor a single sorry aircraft in Ukraine’s sky to help. What we do get is too little, too late, and a continued purchasing of mafia goods to boot.