To effectively counter Russia’s escalating aggression, the U.S. must urgently revise its policy to allow Ukraine to strike deeper into Russian territory.

Serhii Kuzan

Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center

August 14, 2024

In May 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the U.S. would provide Ukraine with High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). He clarified that Washington did not endorse or allow Ukraine to launch strikes outside its borders. “We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia,” Biden wrote. Although restrictions have since eased, U.S. officials maintain that the overall policy on attacking targets in Russia remains unchanged – long-range strikes deep into Russian territory are still off-limits. 

Yet, after two and a half years, Russia continues its relentless war. Russian forces are using guided aerial bombs to strike major cities, including Kharkiv, and have recently destroyed 80% of Ukraine’s thermal generation and one-third of its hydroelectric generation, leaving Ukrainians facing a perilous winter.

Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently reiterated that he can only be stopped by force. This has led to growing support among Western leaders for allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory with Western weapons. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pressed this point in Washington on the sidelines of the NATO summit in July. U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer appeared to shift the U.K.’s policy, stating on July 10 that Ukraine could use British long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike Russia.

The debate over Ukraine’s right to respond to Russian aggression under international law intensified on May 3, when U.K. Foreign Secretary David Cameron declared that Ukraine has the right to strike targets in Russia using British weapons because Moscow is bombarding Ukrainian territory. More than a dozen countries now support Ukraine’s right to respond symmetrically with weapons produced by them.

However, the U.S. remains the most critical player. Only Washington can adequately meet the Ukrainian military’s needs for long-range weapons, both in quantity and quality. If the U.S. were to authorize Ukraine to use these weapons to strike military targets in Russia, it could prompt other allies, like Germany, to contribute their own long-range weapons, such as Taurus cruise missiles. 

Germany currently refuses to supply its Taurus missiles to Ukraine, fearing that it could draw Berlin into direct conflict with Russia. The German missile has a higher hit probability and a longer range than, for example, the Storm Shadow, making it potentially more effective if used by Ukrainian forces against legitimate targets in Russia.

Zelensky announced on May 31 that Washington had authorized the limited use of U.S. weapons in the Russian region bordering Kharkiv. The U.S. has now extended this authorization to allow Ukraine to use American weapons against any Russian forces attacking across the border, not just in Kharkiv. 

However, this permission is only a half-measure. For effective defense, the U.S. should completely lift restrictions on Ukraine repelling Kremlin aggression, especially by authorizing the use of long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against legitimate military targets throughout Russia.

Currently, Kyiv is unable to respond symmetrically to attacks, being restricted to its own territory occupied by Russia and a 100-kilometer strip of Russian territory near the border. Meanwhile, Russia strikes both military and civilian targets in Ukraine almost daily from its territory, using a wide range of weapons – from strategic aircraft and bombers to multiple-launch rocket systems and surface-to-air missiles that kill civilians and destroy cities.

Ukraine has a proven track record of effectively using Western weapons, particularly American ones, to gain advantages on the battlefield and liberate territories – such as in the liberation of Kherson in late 2022, when Ukrainian HIMARS destroyed Russian logistics on the right bank of the Dnipro River, or the strikes by U.K-French Storm Shadow cruise missiles against the headquarters and ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 

These strikes, alongside the liberation of Zmiinyi Island and other actions, were crucial in restoring Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea to pre-war levels. According to Bloomberg, global wheat prices began to drop after the first grain ship left Ukraine in August 2023.

Even the limited use of these weapons is already yielding results. Following the U.S. granting limited authorization, the Ukrainian military launched a HIMARS strike against a Russian air defense system in Belgorod Oblast, with a video of the burning equipment broadcasted by Russian TV channels on June 3. The strike destroyed or damaged two radars and two S-400 launchers that were targeting Kharkiv. In May Russian forces launched 76 strikes on Kharkiv, killing and injuring 278 people. In June, the number of strikes dropped to three. 

Redirecting strikes

If Ukraine were allowed to use long-range weapons to destroy legitimate military targets in response to Moscow’s attacks, Russia could face a potential “strike zone” of up to 300 kilometers, presenting new challenges for the Kremlin. 

Securing the border regions is critically important for the Russian military-industrial complex and the army as a whole, as many Russian military facilities are located in the European part of the country, within the potential strike zone. 

For instance, the Russian composite materials plant Avangard in Safonovo, Smolensk Oblast, part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation, produces transport-launch containers and engine housings for solid-fuel missiles used against Ukraine. Smolensk is also home to an aviation plant that was struck by Ukrainian drones in November 2023, disrupting the production of Kh-59 missiles.

It is also crucial to strike at rear military units, depots, and, most importantly, airfields within Russia. In the 300-kilometer border zone with Ukraine, Russia has approximately 184 military units of the Russian Defense Ministry, the FSB, and the Russian National Guard, and at least 18 military airfields regularly used for strikes against Ukraine, logistics, and radio reconnaissance.

Despite limited means, the Ukrainian military has achieved some success in hitting such targets behind enemy lines using available resources, including attack drones and sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

For example, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate attacked the Seshcha, Shaykovka, and Voronezh airfields with Ukrainian drones, and a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber was destroyed for the first time at the Soltsy airfield by a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group. However, these strikes could have been far more impactful with more powerful and long-range weapons from allies.

However, the available weapons are not always sufficient to effectively target positions in the rear. Moscow is aware of the relative security of its border from high-precision and long-range weapons, allowing it to use existing military facilities and build new ones.

There is still a window of opportunity to target Russian airfields and aircraft effectively. Russian military experts and bloggers have long warned about the lack of protective shelters for military aircraft, like concrete hangars, suggesting earth-filled cargo containers as an alternative. These concerns are valid: aircraft at airfields are protected only along the perimeter and remain vulnerable from above.

Cluster munitions could significantly damage Russian aviation under these circumstances. ATACMS cluster munitions, which cover a large area without leaving large craters, could turn unarmored aircraft into a sieve. If not intercepted, just a few ATACMS Block I cluster missiles could disable an entire squadron of the Russian Aerospace Forces at an airbase within 150 to 300 kilometers of Ukraine.

Another advantage of attacking military and strategic targets in Russia is forcing the Russians to redeploy air defense assets to protect these sites. This creates gaps in the Russian air defense system, allowing Ukrainian drones to penetrate more than 1,800 kilometers into Russian territory.

Ukraine’s defense is defined by international law but is hampered by restrictions imposed by its partners. Ukraine could strike Russian positions at considerable depth, and removing these restrictions would also hinder Russia’s ability to build up reserves on the border and advance deeper into Ukraine’s northern regions.

The Kremlin has used blackmail and intimidation to establish a position among Western countries that any strike on Russian targets with Western weapons would implicate the West in the war. However, these “red lines” are not effective, and the Kremlin has already claimed it is at war with NATO. For example, there was no response to the HIMARS strikes on military targets in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast or the use of U.S. long-range ATACMS missiles on the military airfield in Dzhankoy, Crimea.

Improving defense capabilities 

Existing restrictions by Ukraine’s allies give the aggressor an invaluable advantage. For instance, defeating Russian fighters stationed at air bases in border regions would deprive Russian army assault units of effective air support during offensive operations, as seen during the assaults on Avdiivka and Bakhmut. 

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated after the June 13 Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting that Washington’s decision to allow the Ukrainian military to use American weapons to strike Russian targets positively impacted the operational situation in Kharkiv Oblast, slowing down the Russian offensive and preventing serious breakthroughs.

Additionally, lifting restrictions would help neutralize the threat posed by Russian aircraft to cities like Kharkiv and Ukrainian military positions. Since early 2024, Russian combat aircraft have dropped more than 3,500 bombs on Ukrainian positions, 16 times more than the same period last year. Russia uses Su-34 bombers 30 to 60 kilometers from the front line to strike Ukrainian fortifications or cities, and the short-range surface-to-air missiles Ukraine currently employs cannot reach these aircraft. However, if allies permit, this situation could change.

The 100-kilometer strike zone on Russian territory, as reported by Western media, is insufficient for effective strikes on key Russian air bases, such as Voronezh Baltimor and Buturlinovka, where Su-34 bombers targeting Ukraine are based.

Striking Russian military air bases would force the Russian command to relocate these bases beyond the 300-kilometer strike zone, increasing the flight time of Russian aircraft to the launch area and reducing their service life. For instance, according to U.K. intelligence, the Ukrainian attack on the Kushchevskaya airfield forced Russia to withdraw about 40 aircraft of various types and disperse them to airfields farther from the front line. The increased approach time of Russian aircraft would also allow more time for detection and response in Ukraine, both on the ground and in the air, providing advance warning of attacks.

Political considerations should not override sound military strategy for success in war. Restrictions raise the cost of defense, as defensive weapons are much more expensive than the means of destruction.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James O’Brien recently noted that if Russia tries to expand the front, Ukraine will be allowed to fire at a greater distance. According to O’Brien, Russia is losing its ability to attack due to Ukraine’s destruction of Russian facilities near the border. This statement confirms the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes on Russian military targets. 

However, it also indicates a lack of political will in Washington to permit the broader use of American weapons. Expanding the strike distance is possible only if Russia launches a new offensive, so the U.S. seems primarily concerned with self-restraint rather than potential risks or Russia’s reaction.

Currently, the delay in making such a decision negatively impacts the security of Ukrainian cities and the situation at the front. This is a strategic issue, and Ukraine cannot wait for Moscow to expand the front by launching an offensive in northern Ukraine or other regions.

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent. This article was originally published by War on the Rocks on July 16, 2024, and has been republished by the Kyiv Independent with permission.