Apr 03, 2026

Guided glide bombs or KABs have been one of Russia’s most dangerous weapons. Launched from jets 30 miles or more behind the lines to avoid air defenses, they inflict massive damage on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions alike, with more than 5,700 dopped in one month.

Countering them is a major challenge. A RAND piece from 2024 notes that jamming might be feasible but that “In warfare, silver bullets are rare.” In 2024 Ukraine could effectively counter the bombs with jammers, causing them to miss their targets, but new Russian receivers nullified the jamming and bombardment resumed. Now Ukraine is deploying an upgraded jammer which overcomes even the best Russian technology.

“The effectiveness of KABs dropped to zero,” a spokesman for the developers of the Lima-Quant system told me. “On a roughly 700 km stretch of the front, the enemy dropped 869 KABs in one of the previous months. The consequences of these strikes were minor injuries to eight servicemen.”

These are the same developers responsible for the earlier Lima system claimed to be responsible for diverting Kinzhal missiles into empty fields. Like Lima, the upgraded Lima Quant was developed with the Night Watch unit rather than central government or military organization. But the challenges involved in fielding it have been as much political as technical.

The Guided Bomb Threat

The KAB (“Korrektiruyemaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba “ or “Adjustable Aircraft Bomb”) seirs is the direct Russian equivalent of the U.S. JDAM (“Joint Direct Attack Munition”) series. It upgrades a dumb, unguided bomb with steering fins and satellite guidance enabling it to hit a pre-programmed location on the map. Under good conditions accuracy is better than 20 meters, enough to hit a specific building.

Folding wings give the bombs extended range. Some advanced versions have a claimed range of 120 miles, though most are more like 40 miles. This is much less than the 1,000+ mile range of the Shahed, but while Shaheds have a warhead of 100 or 200 pounds, KABs span a range from 500 and 1,000 pounds the way up to block-busting 3,000-pound KAB-1500 which leaves a crater 50 feet across. They are used as super-heavy artillery to destroy Ukrainian bunkers and fighting positions, and to attack civilian infrastructure.

These glide bombs fly at hundreds of miles per hour and are extremely difficult to shoot down. But they do have an Achilles Heel, and in 2024 many were being jammed causing the navigation to fail so they missed their targets.

“The effectiveness of KABs depends directly on their guidance system,” says the spokesman. “Previously they used the Kometa-4 CRPA, and later—after Ukraine expanded its Electronic-Warfare (EW) system—Kometa-8.”

The CRPA or Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna or CRPA, pronounced “serper,” is also called an adaptive antenna, null-steering antenna or beamforming antenna. It uses multiple antenna elements and combines their signals in smart ways. One is addition: adding two signals together to boost the amplification. But it can also be used for subtraction. By shifting the phase of a signal when it is combined, a CRPA selectively removes that signal from the output, effectively tuning it out. This is similar to how noise-cancelling headphones selectively block out sounds.

This technique requires an additional antenna element to generate each null. The Kometa-4 had four elements, meaning it could generate three nulls and so cancel out three jammers. Kometa-8 with 8 elements could work against up to 7 jammers.

The same Kometa guidance systems are found in Shahed drones and other Russian weapons including the Kinzhal hypersonic missile. All are vulnerable to a sufficient volume of jamming. But the Russians kept increasing the number of elements to 12 and even 16. More importantly they changed way their antenna arrays worked.

“The Russians developed a fundamentally new series of CRPAs,” says the spokesman. “We compare their creation to the development of the Enigma in World War II. These CRPAs are capable of resisting a level of jamming that significantly exceeds the number of their antenna elements.”

A new Russian 8-element system required 19 jammers to counter. The 16-element version could not be countered even with 104 jammers. And when jamming did work, it was only effective at short ranges — “from tens of kilometers to hundreds of meters.”

The new CRPA technology meant that Russian KABs were again effective – until the development of the Lima-Quant system. Details remain secret, but the claimed effects are dramatic.

Jamming — And Interference

“The KABs either did not hit, or they could not even be released, because the guidance system produced a navigation error,” says the spokesman. “Russian pilots did not understand what was happening, because navigation on these CRPAs was lost 100 km before the line of combat. A similar situation occurred with Shahed drones. Objects protected by Lima EW could not be struck.”

Jamming does not distinguish friend from foe though, and the system affects Ukrainian satellite navigation too.

“Brigade commanders conducting combat operations began imposing bans on EW operation, arguing that their Mavic drones and bombers could not carry out missions,” says the spokesman. “These bans are our main problem right now.”

The spokesman says the problem could be solved by modifying the Ukrainian drones, and blames local commanders for not wanting to invest the time, money and effort requires. They would rather lower the jamming shield at intervals and risk the consequences. There was also another problem from the “friendly” side.

“Competitors, unhappy with the extremely rapid pace of Lima deployment, began making unfounded complaints to law enforcement,” says the spokesman, and they were embroiled in a corruption investigation. “The work of the team and the manufacturer was suspended for more than half a year, which led to significant losses.”

Accusations of corruption (and actual corruption) are unfortunately common in the Ukrainian defense sector.

The various types of interference have not prevented Lima-Quant being deployed and the makers claim it is uniquely effective, with no other EW system able to counter the new Russian Kometas.

“Today, Lima Quant is the only system in the world capable of suppressing these CRPAs at a distance of 50 km; KABs at distances of more than 100 km; and cruise and ballistic missiles at even greater distances,” says the spokesman.

As well as glide bombs, he claims the system has been responsible for blocking Russia’s Kinzhal missiles – “Of 42 missiles launched, we managed to neutralize 41—most of them by breaking them apart in the air without detonation.”

The Game Of Cat And Mouse Continues

Claims about superweapons and silver bullets should always be regarded with caution, especially in the absence of any technical details. But an officer of the Night Watch was able to confirm the essential details of the Lima-Quant, adding:

“When implemented on a sufficiently large scale and coordinated across operational sectors, these systems can dramatically limit the ability of guided bombs and UAVs to strike intended targets.”

In 2025, Ukrainian officials confirmed that they were starting to counter Russian glide bombs with electronic warfare systems and said these were being extended, but gave no details.

Russian sources also note that some weapons have become inaccurate, complaining that Iskander ballistic missiles are missing by a kilometer.

Electronic warfare is a never-ending arms race. When one sides develops a better jammer, the other develops a counter-jamming receiver., and any advantage is temporary. If the developers are correct though, Lima-Quant at present provide welcome respite from some of Russia’s deadliest weapons.