06/22/2026

The Ukrainian drone raid on Moscow on June 18 demonstrated the inability of the air defense of the capital of the aggressor country (which until recently was considered the most echeloned and impenetrable in Russia) to prevent a breakthrough. Moreover, this is not the first time that Moscow’s air defense has failed to cope with attacks of this type, and sometimes even… helps our UAVs hit targets.

So what is happening with Russian air defense? Let’s find out.

But first I want to pay attention to additional factors, and then we will look in detail at the main problem.

Firstly, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian army has lost more than 1,400 air defense systems. These are short-, medium-, and long-range air defense systems, air defense systems, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, radar systems, and radar stations. The Russian military-industrial complex is simply unable to compensate for such losses, and they can be called absolutely irretrievable.

Secondly, since the end of 2025, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces have organized a targeted hunt for Russian air defense systems, mainly striking the Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense system, the Tor-M2 air defense system, and others.

https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/226329

Currently, the Russian Air Defense Forces are losing 30 to 40 air defense systems every month, while their production capacity is only a few units of finished products per month. That is, every month Russia is running out of air defense systems due to the inability to compensate for the losses they are currently experiencing with new products.

Thirdly, the depletion of ammunition. Over four years, Russian short- and medium-range air defense systems have almost completely exhausted Soviet and pre-war Russian stocks of anti-aircraft guided missiles by 2022. Russian air defense is facing a serious shortage of ammunition, which is being produced many times slower than Ukrainian drones.

And now the most important thing is a technological defect called the Pantsir-S1 missile defense system. And it is this that we will examine in the most detail.

The first steps of “Pantsir-S1”

The Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun complex was developed at the turn of the late 1980s and early 1990s, but the final stage fell precisely in the mid-1990s. This complex was considered a promising replacement for Soviet short-range complexes, primarily the land-based 2S6 Tunguska air defense missile system, as well as the Kortyk naval air defense missile system.

But, despite the readiness of the complex and its pompous presentation in 1995 at the MAKS international aerospace air show, for some reason they were in no hurry to adopt the new creation of JSC “Design Bureau of Instrumentation”. And to the question “why?” the answer was quite simple: the complex is raw, unfinished, and unreliable.

In the 1990s, it was not so easy to lobby for unfinished and defective weapons, and there were quite a few opponents of the complex’s adoption. But over time, a number of adequate specialists left the business, retired, and someone even died, and the lobbying of “KBP” only grew. And as a result, in 2012, the complex was adopted for service, and also launched into mass production.

In addition, the Pantsir-S1 SAM system received comprehensive support from the Russian leadership in promoting itself on the foreign market, becoming the main short-range complex advertised for export.

But perhaps the opinion about this complex was biased, and in the years that have passed since the first presentation, its problems have been solved?

The first failure of the Pantsir-S1 missile defense system

I admit, I used to pay little attention to this complex, it somehow bypassed me as the main object of interest. But everything changed in 2015, when the Pantsir-S1 was sent to Syria to cover the Khmeimim airbase and failed miserably in its mission – to show in combat conditions how “unparalleled in the world” it is.

It was then that the Khmeimim airbase was particularly vulnerable to drone attacks by the resistance forces, and the complex, designed to combat small, low-flying subsonic targets, was supposed to cope with this with a bang. But everything turned out to be just the opposite!

A verified fact, which was later made public in open sources, is a report on firing at enemy targets, during which the complex shot down three drones, using 13 anti-aircraft guided missiles. In parallel with the Pantsir-S1 SAM system, the Tor-M2 SAM system was located at the base, which shot down four targets using five SAMs.

In reports on the combat use of the complexes from April to October 2018, the Tor-M2U SAM system destroyed 80 drones of the Syrian resistance forces, using 100 anti-aircraft guided missiles, while the Pantsir-S1 intercepted only 19% of targets.

Operators noted serious problems with the complex’s fire control system (FCS), fixation, tracking and destruction of small targets. The effectiveness of the Pantsir-S1 increased as the size of the target increased – aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, but it still coped extremely poorly with small targets.

One of the problems was not only the SKV, but also the old Soviet missile 9M311 in a new version – 9M335. It was added with an upper stage, which increased the flight range to 20 km, as well as the speed, but deprived the missile of the ability to maneuver!

Someone will exclaim: how is that possible, because the rocket has nose rudders designed for maneuvering! And it’s true, they are there. But as long as the powerful booster is working, which gives the rocket both range and speed, these rudders are completely useless.

In turn, at that time the complex had already been purchased by countries such as Algeria (first deliveries in 2012), Iraq (2014), the UAE (from 2009 to 2013 – that is, even before it was adopted for service in the Russian Federation itself) and a number of other countries.

It is noteworthy that some countries continued to purchase Pantsir-S1 even knowing about its failed mission in 2015–2018, for example, the same Saudi Arabia, which signed a contract for them in 2021 and received the first batch in 2024. It is strange, but why did they wait so long for the first delivery, did something really happen in 2022 that significantly affected the pace of production of complexes at the Tula KBP?

But there were countries that adequately assessed the capabilities of the imperfect creation of the Tula gunsmiths. For example, Vietnam, after trial use of one complex, refused to purchase it. And Jordan, which expressed a desire to purchase 70 complexes, after a detailed study of them, refused to conclude a contract.

But perhaps the mistakes of 2015–2018 were taken into account and corrected by gunsmiths?

The failed credo of the Pantsir-S1 missile defense system

During the clashes in Libya between the forces of the Government of National Accord (Tripoli) and the Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the LNA actively used the Pantsir-S1 complexes, transferred to it by the UAE, to cover its troops. In turn, the UNZ actively used the Bayraktar TB2 UAV.

At the first stage of the confrontation, the Russian complex was quite effective in shooting down the “Bayraktars”, but this was due not so much to the improvement of the quality of the “Pantsir” as to the ignorance of the Bayraktar TB2 pilots of the algorithms for countering the Russian air defense system. But after some time, the “Pantsir-S1” air defense systems also began to burn one after another. According to various sources, the LNA lost from 9 to 15 complexes.

But despite all these historical moments, the complex, thanks to the lobbying of “KBP”, has become the most widespread short-range SAM system in service with the Russian army. And it is it that covers Moscow and the Moscow region more than any other system of a similar class.

And on June 18, everyone clearly saw how he coped with his task, launching three missiles at a slowly hovering drone, which missed, and then these missiles fell somewhere. For example, into a tank with oil products.

https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/228858

Serial technological failure

From a technological point of view, the Pantsir-S1 air defense system is a completely failed air defense system.

Its 2A38M automatic cannon is not capable of accurately engaging low-flying subsonic targets the size of a Zhiguli, and it mainly uses its missile armament, which also has a number of shortcomings.

The fire control system, which has never been put into operation, still does not allow the complex to effectively lock on, track and hit targets. The system is easily “distracted” by extraneous objects, for example, even birds!

Why is Pantsir-S1 placed on the roofs of buildings and towers in wooded areas? Because its fire control system “goes crazy” when used in cities with dense low-rise or, even more so, multi-story buildings. And a missile that practically does not maneuver while the upper stage is operating needs a clear, predictable reference point from the radar, which does not cope with this task well.

In recent months, we have seen many videos of the “PRYMARY” unit of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s GUR, which carries out regular raids on the temporarily occupied peninsula. In particular, hunting Russian air defense and directly the Pantsir-S1 SAM system.

There are dozens of videos of the destruction of Russian Pantsir-S1s, which see an enemy drone, launch a missile, and it seems to fly straight into it, but it only seems so… The missile misses, and sometimes crashes into the ground literally in front of the drone.

This is an aerodynamic “breakthrough”, when the missile must maneuver to the target using the nose rudders, but the upper stage does not allow this to be done, giving the missile a straight flight trajectory. An ideal anti-aircraft guided missile is a means of destruction in which the center of mass is located practically in the same plane as the center of application of aerodynamic force, which is used in most air defense systems, including Soviet air defense systems. For example, the 9M330 family missiles of the above-mentioned Tor-M2 air defense system are built on this principle, but not the Pantsir-S1 air defense system.

In fact, the Pantsir-S1 air defense system is a failure in every respect. And I haven’t even touched on the very concept of placing such an air defense system on an 8×8 KamAZ-53958 chassis, which does not provide any stabilization when firing from 2A38M automatic guns, but on the contrary – contributes to transverse oscillations.

And this is currently the main, serial short-range air defense system in service with Russia, designed to protect primarily drones from attacks.

I think it’s now quite clear why the effectiveness of this defense looks exactly as Russians can observe it in the morning from their windows – from Tuapse to Ust-Luga, from Saratov to Moscow.

But still, the failure of the Russian air defense system should be considered comprehensively: both taking into account the facts indicated at the very beginning, and based on the results of a detailed description of what this “unparalleled in the world” Pantsir-S1 air defense system really is.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/goritime-moskva-i-ne-tilki-scho-stalosya-z-rosijskoyu-ppo-i-chomu-zrpk-pantsir-s1-stav-velikoyu-problemoyu-dlya-voroga.htm