01/22/2026
The new Minister of Defense, Mikhail Fedorov, stated that the strategic goal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is to increase the losses of Russian occupation forces to 50,000 people per month. Why was this figure announced and how realistic is it to achieve? Let’s figure it out.
Just the day before, I described the progressive, but inevitable, transition of the Russian occupation forces to small group tactics. One of the reasons for this was the devastating losses of the ROV in the armored vehicles category and the inability to use it as massively and intensively during the offensive as in 2022-2024.
To solve the offensive tasks, the troops of the aggressor country switched to the total use of exclusively the infantry component in offensive operations , which made it possible to partially solve the tasks set, but at the cost of extremely high losses.
In September 2024, in the article “Russia is preparing a “horde invasion”: how Ukraine can turn the situation around and dramatically increase the enemy’s losses,” I noted that 2025 will be the year of the Russian army’s final transition to the marching battalion format, and we should prepare for confrontation with a large number of enemy human resources. And also that given the expected mobilization volumes in Russia, in order to exhaust its troops, the ROV should lose an average of 50 thousand people every month.
Unfortunately, in 2025, the Defense Forces of Ukraine did not reach the enemy annihilation rate necessary for its exhaustion . And even vice versa: in terms of the number of monthly losses in the ROV, there was even an apparent improvement in the indicators – a decrease to 30-32 thousand personnel per month. However, there was a nuance – the number of killed, “200s”, increased sharply, which today exceeds 65% of the total number of monthly losses .
However, to understand the figure of 50 thousand, it is necessary to explain why it was announced, and not 60, 70, or 100,500.
The golden mean
I will say right away that the enemy’s loss rate of 50,000 people is not stable, but variable, which directly depends on the level of replenishment of the Russian army due to mobilization measures every month and not only.
Currently, the monthly replenishment of the DOM looks like this (in monthly terms):
– mobilization measures through agitation and through signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense – from 25 to 30 thousand people per month;
– voluntary mobilization – approximately 1-1.5 thousand people;
– involvement of reservists – from 2 to 3 thousand people;
– recruitment campaigns in third world countries, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, etc. – an average of 1-2 thousand people;
– repressive mobilization within Russia itself, in particular the forced sending to the front of so-called naturalized Russians (migrants who received Russian passports) – up to 5 thousand people.
Thus, under current conditions, the ROV can mobilize an average of up to 35 thousand people each month.
In addition, there are several other categories of personnel replenishment.
For example, at the expense of lightly wounded, who are quickly returned to service . Until 2025, this figure per month averaged 20-25% of the total number of losses in the “300” category. Now it is from 1 to 3 thousand people.
Similarly, with captured occupiers, who often return to the combat zone after an exchange . The figure varies from month to month, as Russia often sabotages exchanges.
Thus, with losses of 50,000 people every month, Russia will not be able to fully replenish its occupation forces and will gradually go into the red in terms of the number of ROVs on the territory of Ukraine.
In the long term, this will not only prevent the Russian army from carrying out offensive operations, but also from controlling the line of contact and conducting defense.
But there is a nuance.
Variability
I completely agree with Mikhail Fedorov’s statement about the need to bring the neutralization of Russian occupiers to 50 thousand, since I spoke about this figure back in September 2024. But I repeat, this is a variable figure that depends on a number of factors.
In particular, in 2026, Russia plans to significantly increase mobilization measures, both overt and hybrid, in order to continue the war.
Just a month ago, in December 2025, in an article on OBOZ.UA “Russia Announces Call-up of Reservists: What Threats Does This Pose to Ukraine and How Could It Affect the Course of the War,” I named threats that could significantly affect mobilization for the needs of the Armed Forces in 2026.
Putin signed a law amending Federal Law No. 53-FZ of March 28, 1998 “On Military Duty and Military Service,” which makes the conscription of Russians who are not in the reserve year-round from January 1, 2026. That is, conscripts will be called up throughout the year, and not just in spring and autumn, which will allow increasing the number of conscripts to at least 500,000people.
The State Duma itself is considering the possibility of passing a bill that would equalize conscripts and contract soldiers in their duties of “defending the homeland.” This would allow the command of the Russian occupation forces to openly use conscripts in the combat zone in Ukraine.
Contract mobilization will not change. The ROV will be provided with a stable influx of human resources – in annual terms, this is about 400 thousand people.
The functionality of reservists will be expanded and the active part will increase from 100 thousand in the rear areas, even in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, which will free up the resources of regular troops for deployment in the LBZ.
Let’s not forget about recruitment in third world countries and the repressive mobilization methods of the Russian Security Service. And here we get a figure of over 50 thousand people.
That is, if all mechanisms are activated in 2026, the ROV could receive up to a million manpower, or 80-85 thousand per month.
This is what variability is when assessing threats – not minimal, but maximal. And hypertrophied maximal.
But a completely rational question arises: will we be able to ensure even 50,000 enemy casualties in 2026?
Losses
We could have reached the loss rate of 50 thousand bodies in the ROV as early as 2025, if we had started preparing and predicting the enemy’s actions as early as 2024. But this did not happen, so as a result of 2025 we have an extremely half-hearted effect.
If even in September 2024 we had begun to form defense lines with an emphasis on anti-personnel barriers, especially in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, today we would not have the Hulyaipol crisis and the threat to Pokrovsky with the prospect of forming a bridgehead for an offensive on Zaporizhia .
If, starting in September 2024, the fields and forest belts of Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions were to turn into endless obstacle courses, with “yogoza”, entanglement, anti-personnel mines, anti-tank ditches, embankments, and other elements of passive and active counteraction to enemy infantry, then 50,000 losses could be achieved by mid-2025.
But this was not done or was done to an extremely limited extent.
In general, we still have the opportunity to achieve such indicators , and in a certain sense and in a number of directions there is time to create conditions for the enemy’s losses at this level . The main thing is to understand that this will be the result of an exclusively complex impact, without a unified ideology of some Wunderwaffe.
That is, it is a complex application of passive and active means.
Passive means are anti-personnel barriers, lines of defense, I wrote about this in detail in the article “Russia is preparing a “horde invasion”: how Ukraine can turn the situation around and dramatically increase the enemy’s losses” and it concerns this component.
It is also important to pay attention to artillery, which continues to play an important role in countering the Russian offensive , as was also written in the article – “Battalion artillery will soon become one of the main tools in the fight against Russian occupiers: what the Defense Forces of Ukraine need . “
Complete ignoring of the issue of light MLRS led to a total failure in this component of the Defense Forces of Ukraine – despite the fact that the DOV is constantly trying to adjust and adapt to the current conditions of conducting combat operations using these means of destruction. Such means were described in the material “Ukraine is faced with an acute issue of increasing the level of losses of the enemy: one of the most important roles is in MLRS. Analysis of opportunities”.
Given that all these articles were written in 2024, and we did not see the results of countering the Russian mass of people during 2025, but just the opposite – the seizure of territories of Ukraine of a larger area than in 2024 took place, we can conclude that adaptability to the new challenges of war, if it was carried out, was extremely situational and locational.
To make 2026 not a defeat, but an important stage towards victory on Ukraine’s terms (and as Ukraine sees victory), reform and adaptation are needed. And they are needed as soon as possible, here and now, because tomorrow will be too late.
Let’s hope that Mikhail Fedorov’s statements are not just words, but a plan. A real plan for how we will systematically and effectively increase the enemy’s losses, creating the conditions for our future victory.
Ukraine needs to be getting the type of weapons into service that can achieve the big numbers of orc annihilation that are so crucial : cluster munitions, modern artillery, huge swarms of killer drones, sonic weapons and microwave weapons.
Since the putinaZis are deploying gas, I’d have no problem with Ukraine doing the same; provided they have sufficient resources of modern gas masks.
Not to forget Taurus and Tomahawks.