09.29.2023
The campaign planned by the Russian command for the summer – autumn of 2023 is clearly not going as “planned”. Moreover, so much so that it was necessary to disrupt the deployment of their strategic reserves and urgently transfer two formed combined arms armies “to the Northern Military District zone.” However, the capabilities of the 18th and 25th OA – primarily for “seizing the strategic initiative” – look, to put it mildly, controversial. Moreover, the Russian command is not mistaken on this score – this is evidenced by how and where it uses these “reserves”.
Dramatic efforts to “stabilize”
According to the plans of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, the formation of the 18th and 25th combined arms armies on the basis of the Southern and Central military districts (naturally, including such processes as manning personnel, weapons and military equipment, as well as combat coordination of units and formations of both armies) and their strategic deployment was supposed to last until approximately December of this year.
That is, according to the plan of the Russian General Staff, having repelled the Ukrainian offensive in the summer and early autumn, by the beginning of winter they expected to have two fresh combined arms armies at their disposal. It’s not hard to guess why.
All this would make sense only if Russian troops managed to completely “slow down” the Ukrainian offensive this summer and fall. It was for this purpose that the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces planned and prepared a strategic defense operation, within the framework of which it was envisaged (based on prepared, echeloned defense in the Southern operational zone) to stop and exhaust the strike forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, then through a local offensive operation of an operational-tactical scale on Kupyansky direction to force the Ukrainian command to use up its reserves and thus, by the beginning of winter, create conditions for regaining strategic initiative. That is, to conduct a strategic offensive operation. Everything, as they say, is according to the textbook, everything is within the framework of the classical Soviet military school.
However, the problem is that it is still impossible to “completely stop” the Ukrainian offensive – despite all the bravura statements of official representatives of the highest military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, including Monsieur Putin himself.
The strike operational-tactical groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are still not “exhausted”, or more precisely, they are exhausted, but not as quickly and intensively as the Russian command would like. Accordingly, it is also not yet possible to completely “slow them down”.
What’s behind the move?
In fact, the movement of Russian strategic reserves “to the Northern Military District zone”, as part of their operational deployment, began a month ago. The advanced units and subunits of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) of the 18th OA began to move to the Crimean-Tavriche operational direction (as part of the Dnepr group of forces) precisely then, as did the arrival of the first units from the 67th Motorized Rifle Division of the 25th OA to the zone of responsibility of the “Center” group of troops – in the Liman direction.
Thus, it is quite possible to say that at least a month ago, the Russian military command made a corresponding decision. And knowing the decision-making procedure in the command structures of the RF Armed Forces, we understand that even earlier the command came to the conclusion that such a decision was necessary. Why?
Yes, because the real condition and combat capabilities of the grouping of troops of the Russian Armed Forces, which is now implementing these strategic plans of the Russian command for the summer-autumn campaign, were not at the level that would ensure their actual implementation. In other words: the plan was in jeopardy.
What’s wrong with reserves
We will talk about the quality of strategic and operational planning of the Russian military command at the relevant levels another time, but now it’s better to look (in the context of the current situation) at the prospects for using these Russian strategic reserves in practice.
By and large, today they look, let’s say, quite “debatable”. And for a number of reasons. For example, the structure and combat composition of these armies at the moment look quite controversial from the point of view of their full use as a strategic reserve.
In particular, the 25th Combined Arms Army has one full-fledged “classic” motorized rifle division – the 67th (three motorized rifle regiments – the 31st, 36th and 37th, as well as the 19th tank regiment). In order to call an army “full-blooded”, precisely in a strategic sense (or at least considered as such – even in Russian realities), it must have at least two such divisions. And better yet, even more.
From this point of view, the entire army set of troops (forces) of this army looks, to put it mildly, somewhat strange.
– 67th Motorized Rifle Division
– 164th separate motorized rifle brigade
– 176th Infantry (?!) Regiment
– 11th separate tank brigade
– 73rd Artillery Brigade
– 189th reconnaissance battalion
– 349th Signal Battalion
– and the repair base of the entire army consists of as many as two repair battalions – the 20th and 149th.
This concludes the list of the main formations, units and subunits of the troops (forces) of this “full-blooded” combined arms army.
There are plenty of “oddities” in the structure of this “strategic” reserve of Russian troops. Starting from the presence in it of such an exotic element as a “rifle regiment”, ending with the absence in it of other, clearly “urgently necessary” elements – such, for example, as more or less coherent air defense at least at the regimental level. The capabilities of this army in the field of repair, logistics (MTO), troop operations, as well as combat command and control and communications also look, to put it mildly, somewhat mediocre. They are either absent from the general complement of troops of a given army, or are clearly underrepresented.
It is obvious that the relevant Russian command structures, while forming and deploying this association of army-level troops, still tried to adhere to the principle of expedient balancing of forces and means. But it didn’t turn out very well for them, let’s say.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the complement of troops (forces) of the 25th Artillery Army became what it became – due to the real (and not “necessary”) capabilities of the Russian command to fill this “strategic reserve” with people, specific types and types of weapons and military equipment, as well as other necessary means and material and technical resources. In other words, the Russian command formed only what it could actually form. As they say, in the absence of stamped paper, you have to write on simple paper.
The limited capabilities of these “strategic reserves” of the enemy are also evidenced by the fact that the level of staffing of both combat and “support” units and subunits of these armies is also quite, let’s say, problematic.
If the main combat formations and units are staffed somewhere at the level of 75-80% and, accordingly, with types of weapons and military equipment (WME) – 55-60%, then the “supply and support” units and subunits are much more deplorable condition. Their corresponding indicators are 60-65% and 45-50%.
Expectation VS reality
Let’s try to derive a “common denominator” from the very fact that the enemy command uses its strategic reserves. And it at least consists of two main parts – the very moment of their use and the real state of these troops.
It is obvious that for the Russian command to put into action its strategic reserves right now, that is, ahead of their PLANNED deployment, is due precisely to the current state of the general strategic situation at the front.
The campaign planned by the Russian command for the summer – autumn of 2023 is clearly going “not as planned.” Moreover, so much so that it was necessary to disrupt the deployment deadlines of their strategic reserves and urgently transfer them “to the Northwestern Military District zone.”
And the second part of this denominator is that due to the existing shortage of personnel and weapons and military equipment, the real combat value of these “strategic reserves” at the moment and primarily in relation to their use “for their intended purpose” (that is there is for “seizing the strategic initiative”) looks, to put it mildly, somewhat dubious. Moreover, apparently, the Russian command is by no means mistaken on this score – this is evidenced by how and where it uses them.
The 25th OA went to replace the 41st OA in the Liman direction – so that the latter would regroup in the Zaporozhye direction, and the second, 18th OA, was deployed in the Kherson direction – clearly with similar goals and objectives.
Obviously, if both armies were currently “in the required tone,” then they would independently surface in other operational-tactical directions (for example, near Kupyansk, Bakhmut, Donetsk or Tokmak), and would not be used as reserve “ersatz” -substitutes.
The material was published as part of the joint project OBOZREVATEL and “Information Resistance” .
This is not good for the mafia army. They wanted these two combined arms armies as assault forces for the fall/winter season, and now they must use them to plug holes in their front lines. Not only that, they are undermanned and not properly equipped. We already can guess what level their training is at.
I want to point out that a mafia combined arms army is equivalent to an army corps in the US and British armies, that is, composed of two or more army divisions.
Attacking and occupying parts of Ukraine as well as murdering ukrainians will surely boost RuSSia’s popularity in Ukraine…