Macron wants to send French ground troops to Ukraine: What to expect if strong words are followed by action

President Emmanuel Macron is sending a signal of strength, but he only has two divisions of conventional ground troops. Nevertheless, his troops could take considerable pressure off of Ukraine.

April 5, 2024

Emmanuel Macron is bringing France back into the game as a military power.

«Emmanuel Macron says he wants to send ground troops to Ukraine: That’s not a good sign, it’s a sign that the West has given up on us,» mocks a Ukrainian stand-up comedian: «The Germans aren’t sending us any Taurus [missiles], the Americans aren’t sending us any money, but Macron is sending his army, probably to show us how to surrender.» It is bitter humor in this third year of the war.

The situation is indeed uncomfortable – in Ukraine and beyond. The Russian army is on the offensive almost everywhere along the front. Ukraine’s ground-to-air defense is receiving too few supplies, which is why attacks from a distance are hitting critical infrastructure hard. Support from the West is flowing slowly. Kremlin propaganda is achieving its goal.

Macron’s posturing – as a boxer on social media, but also as a potential wartime president – therefore seems almost countercyclical. After the Russian attack on Ukraine, France continued to seek dialogue with the Kremlin. In terms of arms deliveries, Paris lags far behind Berlin. But now of all times, when even American aid is blocked, Macron even wants to send his own army to Ukraine, depending on how the situation develops.

«The French bonsai»

It is quite possible that French President wants to send a signal of strategic ambiguity: the Kremlin should not be too sure how war-weary the West really is. Even if Paris is unlikely to take such a step on its own, Macron’s threat must be backed up by real capabilities.

So what might we expect if Macron’s big words were actually followed by action? What would such an operation actually look like? What concrete impact could France have in Ukraine?

The French armed forces are made up of three armies: the Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace with its Rafale and Mirage fighter planes, the Marine nationale, whose flagship, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, is currently cruising off the coast of Benin, and finally the Armée de Terre. France also maintains its own arsenal of nuclear weapons, the Force de Frappe.

In contrast to the German Bundeswehr, the French armed forces are capable of waging war even without a NATO partner. The scale is limited, however. The Armée de Terre now only has two divisions of conventional ground troops under its command, which consist of around 20,000 soldiers each.

By comparison, at the end of the Cold War in 1989, the French army consisted of three corps with a total of 10 divisions and a rapid action unit. During the war on terror, Paris reduced the hard core of its armed forces to a minimum. A paper from the French National Assembly from 2021 uses the term «French bonsai»: Everything is there, but in miniature.

Defensive deployment with a maximum of one division

In view of the forces and capabilities available, a deployment of the French army in Ukraine is likely to be based on the following operational assumptions:

  • Deployment of one division: France will expose a maximum of half of its conventional ground forces to the risk of direct combat operations. The second division would stand ready as a reserve to prevent the war from spreading. A battalion (600 to 1,000 soldiers) is already permanently stationed in Romania under the code word «Aigle». In the event of an escalation, the body of troops could quickly grow to the size of a brigade (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers).
  • Defensive alignment: With the strength of only one division, it is not possible to attack. That would require an advantage of at least three to one. There are around 300,000 Russian soldiers on the other side of the front line. It is conceivable that the French troops could act as a reserve force to relieve a Ukrainian counteroffensive. However, a selective deployment at a critical point in order to prevent a Russian victory is much more likely. France has followed the strategy of «dissuasion»: The opponent should be «dissuaded» from taking the next step. The French ground troops in Ukraine would act as a forward tripwire for the Kremlin with its own Force de Frappe as a threatening backdrop.
  • Alliance with partners: France would not be alone in a Ukraine mission. For one, the units would have to be integrated into the Ukrainian command structures in order to provide effective added value. Moreover, France would not risk such an expedition without the support of important NATO partners. The focus here would be on Poland, Romania and, above all, the British, who are already present in Ukraine. Politically, this would likely amount to a revival of the entente cordiale between London and Paris.

According to textbook strategy, the operational area of a division is defined as 50 by 30 kilometers, plus a field of «operational depth» of a maximum of 50 kilometers. More modern models focus on concentric gravity zones with a radius of 50 to a maximum of 80 kilometers. Within this space, the division is spatially and temporally superior to an opponent and could therefore fend off an attack.

Three variants plus preliminary stage

The Charles de Gaulle ship would be deployed to the eastern Mediterranean in support and as a projection of military strength. This would mean that some of the Rafale jets would be close to the operational area in order to control the airspace above the French focus zone. It would also be crucial to have a detailed picture of the situation, which could only be drawn up in close cooperation with NATO.

France lacks fifth-generation fighter jets such as the F-35, which functions like a flying data vacuum cleaner. Information superiority thanks to state-of-the-art technology enables smaller armies to compensate for their lack of mass, in other words, to hold their own against a mass army, as Western doctrine almost imploringly maintains. The Ukraine mission would be a first test case for this theory.

In concrete terms, three variants as well as a preliminary stage in the Republic of Moldova are conceivable:

The first and third options would be primarily strategic and would have political symbolism: In the event of a Russian breakthrough, the ousting of the Ukrainian government led by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would be given top priority. If France succeeded in protecting the capital Kyiv from being seized, a quick victory of the Kremlin could be prevented.

Odesa is of similar importance. The port city symbolizes the diversity of Ukraine. If it were to fall to Russia, Ukraine would lose a cultural center, which would shake the idea of the Ukrainian nation. In addition, Odesa is currently the country’s most important access point to the Black Sea. If the port city could be secured in the long term, Ukraine would remain a maritime power. The Ukrainian army has already succeeded in considerably weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

If Odesa was safe, Kyiv could increase grain exports. This would give Ukraine more support from developing and emerging countries, which could be crucial for engendering a just postwar order.

Risks for the Alpine region

Option two, a special focus zone at the knee of the Dnieper River, would primarily be of military value. If the Russian army attempted an energetic advance in the southeast, the area north of Zaporizhzhia would be an operational Achilles’ heel for Ukraine’s defense. The city of Dnipro is a real hub in all directions of the country. A French tripwire in this area would mean considerable relief for the Ukrainian combat units on the front lines.

Supporting the Republic of Moldova against Russia’s hybrid war would be a preliminary stage for a Ukraine mission. The situation is currently coming to a head in the region of the Gagauz minority, which is being instrumentalized by Moscow to undermine the authority of the government in Chisinau. Even a small contingent of French ground troops could stabilize the situation.

However, President Macron knows that the open use of military means outside of NATO is associated with risks. Apart from Moscow threatening to use nuclear weapons, test attacks on France with fighter jets or long-range weapons are also conceivable. One of the most vulnerable axes runs via Hungary toward the Alps. The so-called Tirol Corridor is practically unprotected from the air.

In the logic of conventional deterrence, the deployment of ground troops would increase the price of further escalation, even if France does not enjoy the most solid reputation as a military power. In the past, the Kremlin has understood signs of strength better than understanding and compromise. France’s military involvement would therefore probably be Europe’s last chance to prevent a defeat in Ukraine and a major war.

https://www.nzz.ch/english/what-would-happen-if-macron-sent-french-troops-to-ukraine-ld.1824711

2 comments

  1. “France’s military involvement would therefore probably be Europe’s last chance to prevent a defeat in Ukraine and a major war.”

    It is more than high time for the collective leaders in Europe to fully recognize the fact that mafia land will not stop at Ukraine, once this bulwark is defeated, and to do everything possible to assist Ukraine. This help must happen NOW, and not next year.
    French/NATO troops in Ukraine wouldn’t really have to fight. They could take over other tasks that would free up Ukrainian troops to do the fighting.

  2. French troops don’t need to be put into combat. They can be put into a defensive posture. Hopefully others would join such a coalition.
    Ukraine’s Black Sea coast must be preserved at all costs. Therefore foreign troops should be stationed in Odessa and Mykolaiv oblasts. If enough become available, Kherson oblast too.

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