France has strong arguments.

16.03.2024

I would consider the current foreign policy position of French President Emmanuel Macron in the context of the general evolution of strategic thought in the West. At that moment, when Macron made statements like that Putin should not be humiliated, he was obviously sincere. But I repeat again: there has been a process of general evolution of strategic thought from the acceptance of Russia as a threat, and not a potential partner in the future, and regarding what ways there may be in resolving the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Relevant perhaps even at the beginning of the conflict, it is now almost obvious that this was a strategic mistake.

Therefore, firstly, these are general psychological changes, strategic changes not only in Macron’s head, but in general among European Western leaders. The second thing is that Macron even publicly said that his goal is to protect the interests of Ukraine, and he also sees French national interests in this. Now it is difficult to say how much this statement was a surprise not only for partners, but also for France’s own government. Most likely, it was impromptu. It is unlikely that this was preceded by thorough consultations either through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or through the military. But, be that as it may, in my opinion this is quite a positive and I can assume that it is a productive provocation.

With these statements, Macron nevertheless forced European partners to once again seriously think about what conflict scenarios might be if the West does not mobilize to the level that Ukraine wins this war, what scenarios and threats might then be for the European continent. This is that the West will have to send its soldiers (one of the elements of this negative scenario). Macron says — if you don’t want us to have to send our soldiers, let’s now think about how to prevent this.

Secondly, Macron has now taken the first serious step against the generally accepted policy approaches that still dominate both in the United States and in many European countries. This is what is called “escalation management.” For two years, practically one of the key markers was to prevent escalation, not to provoke Putin to any radical actions, including the use of nuclear weapons. With this step, Macron essentially went for an escalation. There was shock in Moscow, judging by those discussions, the reaction. After all, they are already accustomed to the fact that the West and Europe (despite the introduction of new sanctions and the supply of additional weapons to Ukraine) will give back at a critical moment. And here Macron, in fact, broke their paradigm, so I see this, let’s say, as a great positive.

Again, we cannot look into Macron’s head — how decisive he is going to be in the practical implementation of promises for Ukraine, threats to Russia. But, all the same, the word has been said, and after that, it would already look on his part as an undermining of his authority if Macron changes his rhetoric to the opposite.

Regarding the military power of France. remember that it is a nuclear power and the French armed forces are constantly involved in operations. They have, perhaps not so large, but a combat-ready contingent, they have the ability to quickly redeploy these forces. But at the same time, I don’t think that Macron is so serious that in the near future he can offer his brigade or even a battalion to help Ukraine.

France has long-range missiles. France is already supplying Ukraine with Scalp missiles. If Macron continues to make such statements, then first of all, we may be talking about a non-contact war. That is, it could be (I’m not saying practically) a declaration of readiness, for example, at the request of Ukraine to strike targets in the occupied territory of Ukraine. That is, we are not talking about an attack on the territory of Russia, but on the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine has the sovereign right to request such assistance, and the French government, having also a bilateral agreement and guided by other international documents, could respond to this. Even statements of this kind themselves can have an effect.

In one of his statements, Macron mentioned Odesa. It is clear that the entrance to Odesa from the sea is blocked by Turkey. A few weeks ago there was such a slightly strange attempt at provocation. That is, this is a statement by deputies of all levels of Transnistria, then a meeting of the leader of Gagauzia with Putin in person, which generally looked strange from the point of view of diplomatic contacts. But this is such an alarming signal that Russia has not abandoned its intention to set fire to this frozen conflict. Therefore, as a more or less realistic option, Ukraine could invite international forces, for example, to block the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border. That is, this is not participation in hostilities, this is something like crisis management. These are actually the options that, in my opinion, have a more or less realistic appearance.

Many see these statements as Macron’s ambitions for European leadership. This is such a healthy competition with Germany — who will be the first in the rank of allies of Ukraine. That is, if we are talking about some of Macron’s own political interests, then this is apparently a bid for his leadership in Europe. In the context of this natural competition between Paris and Berlin. True, Scholz is not his competitor yet, because, as we know, the perception of this determination is very often based not so much on specific indicators, but on who makes decisive statements. Because the media factor can sometimes play a more powerful role than the practical one.

Well, Macron’s statements on Ukraine — this may also be an attempt not only to provoke, but somewhere to slightly encourage the Biden administration, so that they would also be more decisive in their actions. There was a series of visits by European leaders to Washington, where they tried with all their might to somehow call them to common sense.

https://charter97.org/en/news/2024/3/16/587781