24.07.2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP
Recently, an interesting article was published online, based on verified data on the destruction of the MT-LB (multi-purpose light armored transporter-tractor. – Ed.) in the ranks of the Russian occupation forces. According to it, the ROV (Russian occupation forces. – Ed.) have only a small number of these tracked vehicles at their disposal, and due to the lack of production, they may disappear altogether. And this analysis turned out to be very appropriate in the context of considering the general situation with the occupiers’ losses in the category of armored combat vehicles.
In March 2024, I published an article in which I noted that in two years of war, the ROV had lost as many BBMs (armored combat vehicles. – Ed.) as they had at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. At that time, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 12.5 thousand Russian armored combat vehicles had been destroyed, damaged, and captured.
According to various sources, in 2021, the Russian army had between 12,000 and 15,000 armored fighting vehicles in service. And as of March 2024, about 7,000 armored fighting vehicles of various types and modifications were deployed in the combat zone by Russian occupiers. That is, it turns out that the Russian military-industrial complex sent up to a thousand or more of these vehicles to the combat zone during the year – and these are quite realistic figures.
In the same article “In two years, Russia lost the number of armored fighting vehicles with which it entered a full-scale war” I cited as an example the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to produce and restore armored fighting vehicles until 2022. Then, in a calm and measured mode, deliveries of armored vehicles to the troops were carried out, providing 400-500 units per year and even more. Of course, in the conditions of the transition to the so-called war footing, this figure has increased.
But with the increase in sending BBMs to the front, the withdrawal of this equipment from storage also increased, because most of the hundreds of vehicles sent were restored, not produced from scratch. New ones in the general statistics were no more than 10-15% – the RF military-industrial complex could produce from 150 to 200 units per year.
And here you will ask me: what does the research of Western analysts of MT-LB losses have to do with this? How does it tie in with the topic of BBM?
Litmus MT-LB
Recently, Yigal Levin cited Richard Vereker’s analysis in his post, based on verified data on destroyed MT-LBs. And this material noted a very important detail.
The MT-LB is the third most common vehicle among the ROV (after the T-72 and BMP-2), and their share among the losses of armored vehicles is 18% – it is second only to the losses of the BMP-2.
But I would like to emphasize that this analysis is based solely on verified data, and Richard Vereker himself admits that the actual level of MT-LB losses is much higher. But how much higher?
Back in 2022, I repeatedly encountered disputes about losses published by monitoring resources and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since official data always exceeded data from OSINTers. At that time, many spears were broken in an attempt to explain to people that OSINTers form a base on documented (photo/video) confirmed losses, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine primarily on reports, and secondly on verification.
In reality, verified data is 1.5-2, and sometimes 2.5 times less than real data, depending on the popularity of a particular vehicle. After all, taking a photo against the backdrop of a burnt T-72B3 is much more pathetic than in front of the skeleton of an MT-LB.
Now let’s look at the average figures for losses of armored fighting vehicles according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and OSINT researchers.
According to the General Staff, at the time of writing this article, the losses of the Russian occupiers in the category of combat armored vehicles amounted to 15,980 units. And according to the average indicator of verified data from different monitoring groups – 6,260 units. That is, the difference is 2.5 times between verified information and official.
But let’s get back to our MT-LB. According to verified data, the losses of the ROV equipment of the MT-LB type of all modifications are 1180 units. If this figure is increased by 2.5 times, then we get 2950.
According to OSINTers, before the full-scale war, the Russian Armed Forces had 3,300 MT-LBs, and 2,485 were removed from storage bases. That is, the total number of these vehicles in service should be 5,785, and losses of 1,180 should not have been critical. But they did. MT-LBs have now almost completely disappeared from the line of combat, and if they appear, then one by one.
However, if we consider these figures as a misconception about the combat-ready potential of 3,300, the repairable potential of 2,485, and also the quite realistic loss of 2,950, then everything falls into place.
For years, many analytical agencies that compile ratings of the world’s armies’ power have incorrectly described the potential of the Russian army, using data that does not correspond to reality and presenting unrealistic figures.
It is worth paying attention, as Richard Vereker did, to the minimal presence of the ROV in the combat zone of BTR-60 (two losses verified) and BTR-70 (15 losses verified) during two and a half years of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, according to data from analytical agencies, Russia had at least 800 BTR-60 and more than 500 BTR-70 in storage before the full-scale invasion. But in the third year of the war, they still have not become a component that has replaced the ROV losses – this may be due to difficulties with restoration after storage.
All this indicates that the level of both combat-ready equipment in the Russian Armed Forces and repairable equipment in Russian warehouses was significantly overestimated by analysts.
Conclusions:
Thanks to a detailed analysis of verified MT-LB losses, it became possible not only to confirm the high losses of armored vehicles in Russia, but also to note that the real situation with the restoration of equipment stocks in Russia is much worse than one could imagine.
In turn, monitoring groups remotely confirmed both the data on ROV losses provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and those calculations regarding Russia’s potential, which we have previously published on numerous occasions.
Based on all of the above, we can conclude that 2024 will be a critical year for Soviet BBM stockpiles, and in 2025 Russia will be able to rely only on its domestic production, which does not even come close to satisfying the needs of the ROV to compensate for monthly losses.
The material was published as part of a joint project between OBOZ.UA and the Information Resistance group.
“For years, many analytical agencies that compile ratings of the world’s armies’ power have incorrectly described the potential of the Russian army, using data that does not correspond to reality and presenting unrealistic figures.”
Those analysts have never tried to get an old vehicle running, especially one that has been sitting outside for decades. It’s mostly a very tough job. Just imagine trying to do this with hundreds and thousands.