10/24/2023 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP
The Russian occupation forces went on the offensive along many sectors of the front: Avdeevka, the Liman-Kupyanskaya axis, continuous counterattacks in the area of Bakhmut, Verbovoy, Kopan, in the Staromlinovka area… It seems that Russia simply has an endless human resource with which it can fend off any offensive of the Forces defense of Ukraine. But is this really so? Let’s figure it out.
Mobilization in Russia
According to official data, Russian occupation forces suffered losses of more than 295 thousand personnel during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And this is 100 thousand more than the number of the group that took part in the invasion on February 24, 2022. Some units ceased to physically exist during this time. Nevertheless, the number of ROVs is not critically reduced and the Russian command finds resources to compensate for losses.
Indeed, Russia, a country with a population of 140 million people, has a serious mobilization resource, which, in confrontation with a country like Ukraine, should have total quantitative superiority. But this obvious mathematics has its own nuance – and more than one.
Last fall, Russia carried out the so-called partial mobilization, during which a little more than 300 thousand people were drafted. This mobilization was carried out when, according to the statements of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the losses of the Russian army amounted to something like 6 thousand people, and according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – about 50 thousand personnel.
It is clear that if the occupying army had lost only 6 thousand people, then it would not have had to call up 300 thousand. But it was precisely this “partial” mobilization that showed that the mob potential and readiness of military registration and enlistment offices in the Russian Federation, as well as the availability of barracks, military units, training grounds, etc., are practically absent for such a number.
From about December 2022, mobilization in Russia made it possible to attract a resource of 20-25 thousand people. Thus, after the “partial” one, another 200 to 250 thousand people were forced into the army of the aggressor country. That is, the total number of people mobilized from September to September in Russia amounted to 500 – 550 thousand people.
But is this quantity sufficient, and does it effectively solve the tasks assigned to the Russian armed forces?
Compensation for losses
It would seem that Russia mobilized more personnel over the past year than the Ukrainian troops disposed of, and this completely covers the losses. At first glance, this is exactly so, but then why are there calls in the Russian political environment to ban the return of those mobilized by rotation until the so-called “SVO” [special military operation, aka war–OFP] ends? And appeals from Russian women are increasingly appearing online, begging Putin to return their husbands, sons, and brothers from the “SVO”, where they have been without rotation for a year now.
The fact is that when we talk about losses, we first of all mean the “200s” (killed), some take into account the “300s” (wounded), the more pragmatic ones also remember the “400s” (prisoners), and especially pedantic ones about the “500s” (refuseniks/deserters). But almost no one takes into account several existing needs.
The first; compensation for losses in the format of restoring the combat effectiveness of units. This is when a unit that has suffered losses incommensurable with its combat missions needs to be urgently restored. Often such a need goes beyond the measured mobilization process.
The second need is the creation of new divisions. After all, the Russian army seems to be increasing in numbers, which means that people must be taken from somewhere to form new units in the rear, which in the short term should not be sent to the combat zone. That is, recruited people who will not compensate for losses.
The third need is rotational. What was mentioned above. Units need to be rotated, but they should be replaced by someone on the battlefield. Equivalent units that simply do not exist.
If we cover all these needs in their entirety, then the monthly mobilization in Russia should be from 40 to at least 50 thousand people. But this is not and is unlikely to happen – at least until the end of the elections in 2024.
The resource that is now at the disposal of the ROV is significantly different from what it fought at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And this difference is felt. After all, when the seasoned troops, with many years of experience in military service, attacked, regions, districts, and large cities were captured, and as mob resources [meat puppets] began to prevail in the Russian Army, the offensives slid either to the local level, in the size of a village or town, or to defense, which the Russians could not hold. In turn, the level of losses has increased.
At the same time, mob resources are being drawn on when the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation does not have the ability to fully provide training to everyone on a regular basis. The shortage of equipment, ammunition, supplies – all this affects the survival of a poorly prepared soldier.
Having called up more than 500 thousand people, Russia was unable to achieve during this year even 10% of the goals that the group of 180 thousand achieved in the first half of 2022. A simple and very eloquent comparison, which indicates what the professional component in the troops and regular supplies, compensation for losses are.
And yet, even without any large-scale achievements in the combat zone, this resource plays an inhibitory role, slowing down the advance of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
Leveling and resource ouroboros
The human resource of the Russian occupation army is not decisive in matters of seizing new territories, but is much more effective as an inhibitory element.
On the other hand, Russians have a limit on monthly compensation for losses. And no matter how trivial it may sound, it is precisely the increase in the level of losses of ROV personnel that is the solution to this problem.
That is, the destruction of more than 20 thousand invaders per month is by far the most effective value for bleeding its defense potential. Of course, this must be carried out in conjunction with other actions to neutralize the enemy’s potential, in particular its aviation components, armored vehicles and artillery.
For example, not having a sufficient number of armored combat vehicles, the occupiers are forced to advance either by placing troops on top of tanks, or by using unarmored civilian vehicles. This increases the number of losses. And so on for each point.
But in most cases, in attack or defense, the enemy’s main bet is on numbers. A decrease in these indicators will lead to paralysis and collapse of the defense.
And it cannot be said that this is unattainable. In January, February and March 2023, this figure exceeded 20 thousand, which resulted in a “meat grinder” in Bakhmut. And it was then that Russia was forced to postpone the offensive planned for February along the Liman-Kupyansk axis and the attack on Orekhov and Gulyai-Polye. In June, the losses of the Russian army also exceeded 20 thousand, and then the Russian occupation forces hastily pulled units from other bridgeheads into the Zaporozhye region, since reserves began to dry up very quickly.
Thus, as the war drags on, by attracting human resources, the situation with its provision worsens – as a result of which another component of the functionality of the ROV deteriorates. And the worse this component is, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, the more human resources are needed.
And here the Russian army runs into an existential impasse, when it is impossible to provide a larger amount of technical components to the front, and it will no longer be possible to compensate for its shortage with human resources – as well as to provide a growing resource with this component on a regular basis (for the effective implementation of assigned tasks).
The number of Russian troops and their mobilization potential have always been called the advantage of ROV, but they are also their Achilles heel.
The material was published as part of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the Information Resistance group.
Since Ukraine can never match the sheer number of troops that mafia land can muster, it must rely on the quality of its own forces – its soldiers and leaders – and its superior strategies and tactics.
For this, it MUST be given the tools to strike at mafia land’s real helpful resources. Not its meat puppets so much, but at its logisitc system, its ammo and fuel depots, bridges, aircraft, and so forth. Without bullets, food, and fuel, even a million men are not worth very much on a modern battlefield.
We see the problem the orcs are having. It’s OK to have a massive amount of cannon fodder, but when that cannon fodder is supported by pre-WW2 hardware, you have huge problems.
And leaders with minds from pre-20th century.