10/19/2024 – Translated from Ukrainian via Google and OFP
Last week I started a series devoted to methods of combating the growing human resource of the Russian occupation forces. In the first article I focused on
battalion artillery – mortars, which, with the right approach, should play an important role in destroying the enemy. Today I want to analyze multiple
launch rocket systems (MLRS) in a slightly broader way.
More details about this can be found in the material of the joint project of OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance”.
When we talk about artillery units, we automatically divide them into barrel artillery and rocket artillery. In most cases, the primary focus in any conversation or interview is immediately on barrel artillery – no matter whether it is self-propelled or towed. But MLRS are strangely always in the background, although this is extremely unfair. But not this time.
When talking about classic Soviet and post-Soviet rocket artillery, many immediately associate it with the invariable trio of 122-mm BM-21 Grad, 220-mm BM-27 Uragan and 300-mm BM-30 Smerch. The Soviet army always had a problem with field rocket artillery of calibers below 122-mm, which would have proven themselves excellent at the company and platoon level.
At the same time, a number of countries widely used multiple launch rocket systems of calibers unusual for the USSR with fairly broad capabilities. We are talking about light MLRS.
Crooked lungs of MLRS
During the Soviet era, the issue of light MLRS was not resolved and I would even say ignored. For this reason, in conflict zones where the Soviet army was present and there was a need for such weapons, various home-made variations began to appear – thanks to the installation of unguided missile units from aircraft on tracked and even wheeled vehicles. The placement of the UB-32 unit with 57-mm S-5 aviation NAR on the MT-LB was not something unusual, although the effectiveness of such a non-specialized tandem has always raised questions.
But the fact that the army needed light MLRS, developed exclusively for their functionality, and not constructed from improvised materials according to the principle of “it goes and shoots”, was indisputable. Although the situation with light MLRS in the Russian and Ukrainian armies after the collapse of the USSR did not change dramatically.
In 2017, at the Goncharovsky training ground, the then Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Turchynov was presented with the robotic complex “Phantom-2” with the installed suspended block B8V20 with 80-mm NAR S-8. That is, the issue of the need for an army of light MLRS was acute and was considered, but the decisions were controversial. After all, the principle of crossing the new with the old, which had a completely different functionality, was again applied.
The effectiveness of firing NARs from land-based launchers, especially direct fire, is extremely low. Accuracy is minus, range is reduced, the only plus is the psychological effect it has, demoralizing the enemy.
The Russians were no better off, they were still installing NAR pods on everything they could fit – and pretending that this was a solution that had no analogues in the world. As a result, ignoring the category of light MLRS led to the fact that during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian army very quickly developed both a need for this component and an acute shortage of basic, standard rocket artillery. As a result, the Russian engineering gloomy genius began to breed a multitude of monstrous homunculi.
Nowadays, no one is surprised by the placement of naval rocket launchers on Russian MT-LBs, Urals or even T-80 chassis. First of all, we are talking about variations of the RBU. But in the absence of a sufficient number of regular MLRS and company-level units, such a solution for the ROV was the only possible one to carry out long-range destruction of enemy positions without interaction with other units. Especially considering the presence of a large number of removed naval RBU launchers and a decent supply of ammunition for them in the form of 212-mm RGB-60 bombs with a target destruction range of up to 4.5 km and a warhead weight of 23.5 kg.
As a result, niche units received an inaccurate, crooked, makeshift, but shooting on the principle of “somewhere there” means of destruction, which, due to the absence of a shortage of ammunition for it, made it possible to compensate for the acute shortage of standard MLRS in the troops.
Similarly, the Ukrainian army tried to get out of the difficult situation of the lack of light MLRS in a makeshift manner, but, again, using methods that are well known to us. For example, the Sivalka VM-5 MLRS, which was spotted in 2023, is a makeshift launcher for 24 80-mm S-8 NARs, mounted on a Ford F150 Raptor. It drives, it shoots…
In turn, high-quality and high-tech MLRS are present in other armies of the world, and as an effective means of destroying the enemy’s living and lightly armored components, they are used with very high efficiency.
Not crooked light MLRS
No matter how strange it may look or sound, the leaders in the use of light long-range rocket systems are China, Iran and… the DPRK. In particular, China has an ideal light MLRS for the assault company-platoon link – the FHJ-02.
This is a 62-mm light MLRS with a salvo of 7 rockets, with a target destruction range of up to 800 meters. It is operated by a crew of three, and remotely. It allows you to open enemy fortifications at close range, but it is also an extremely useful thing for defense – especially considering the variety of types of ammunition for it.
In 2022, the Chinese company China South Industries Group Corporation presented 107-mm guided rockets, which received a satellite navigation, control and correction unit, a navigation module based on signals from navigation systems, a laser semi-active guidance system with the ability to designate targets from both UAVs and a ground-based laser target designator, and a classic INS.
The rocket projectile has become so highly accurate, capable of bypassing electronic suppression, that it is difficult to even imagine. But this is the reality of MLRS, which is given sufficient attention in matters of development and evolution.
Not a light, but very interesting 130-mm MLRS, mounted on the Chinese military vehicle EQ-2050. The launcher has a salvo of 16 rockets, which in their modification have a variant with a warhead equipped with more than 2,500 tungsten balls, capable of hitting targets at a distance of more than 15 kilometers.
But no less interesting was the variation from the Brazilians Mac Jee of the light 70-mm MLRS Armadillo on the HMMWV chassis, capable of providing a salvo of 24 rockets at a range of up to 12 km! But at the same time, the system was equipped with quick reload units, which allowed 72 shots to be fired in the shortest possible time.
Iran is no less actively developing the direction of not so much light MLRS, but mobile ones. For example, the Falaq-1 and Falaq-2 rocket systems are installed on a pickup truck. In fact, variations of 240-mm or 333-mm rockets with a firing range of up to 10 km, or a high-power launcher with a 55/110 kg 240-mm/333-mm warhead are placed on the automobile chassis.
Such use of MLRS allows for highly effective opening of enemy positions, operating such systems in the company-platoon link. In turn, the presence of cassette-type warheads, or filled with striking elements, will allow for effective repulsion of enemy assault actions using a large number of manpower.
Conclusions
Unfortunately, in Ukraine, the category of light multiple launch rocket systems has not been developed properly for three decades, and all actions have been focused on attempts to “shove the unshoveable.” Just take and install a block with NARs on anything, so that it “drives and shoots.” Fortunately, our enemies are at the same stage of development. But…
But Ukraine is increasingly faced with the issue of increasing the enemy’s casualties. And MLRS, including light ones, can play one of the main roles in this regard. I repeat – one of.
We have sufficient capacity to produce less complex systems, another issue is providing them with high-tech components that provide high performance characteristics. In particular, accuracy, which is something Soviet jet systems have never been famous for.
No less important is the moment of using shells – both those aimed at destroying the maximum number of manpower, and those aimed at opening up fortified areas.
In the company-platoon link, light MLRS will be no less important than mortars – both in the offensive and in the defensive. And the sooner this category (not at the artisanal level, but at the production level) is given attention, the less negative 2025 will be for us.
Of all the hi tech stuff, electronic warfare, drones, multimillion-dollar gadgets and so on, it’s the simplest weapons and tasks that still count a lot; to slaughter masses of russian cockroaches, day and night, 24/7, 365 days a year.