STUART DOWELL
Stuart Dowell is a political writer at TVP World.
05.09.2025
Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states present one of the vulnerabilities Moscow has tried exploiting. Photos: PAP/EPA/TOMS KALNINS; PAP/EPA/VLADIMIR SMIRNOV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN POO
For three centuries Russia has fought for mastery of the Baltic, from Peter the Great’s wars with Sweden to Stalin’s 1940 annexation, and yesterday’s warning from NATO chief Mark Rutte that Moscow may attack the alliance by 2031 shows the struggle continues.
YOU MAY LIKE:US to phase out security funding for NATO’s eastern flankPolitics
Rutte said at the IISS Defence Summit in Prague that Russia “may attack NATO countries if it decides and is ready” within six years. Inside Moscow, elites told Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar that after the Anchorage summit with Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin believes he has room to “go further.”
The message from both sides is that deterrence in the Baltic is no longer theoretical. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania sit on Russia’s border, hemmed in by Kaliningrad and Belarus, with the Suwałki Gap as their only land link to NATO. War games by U.S. think tank RAND found their capitals could fall within 60 hours if Russian armor broke through before reinforcements arrived.
NATO’s finite timetable
Standing alongside Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala in Prague on September 4, Rutte shifted from open-ended deterrence to a measurable countdown. “We must make sure they never even try,” he said, while Fiala insisted only “solid guarantees” for Ukraine’s security can hold Russia back.
YOU MAY LIKE:NATO chief backs peacekeeping troop deployment to Ukraine [VIDEO]Politics
NATO’s leadership is saying that danger is not abstract but measurable in years, and that Europe’s rearmament must match Russia’s regeneration pace.
Moscow’s post-Anchorage confidence
The August summit between Trump and Putin produced few formal agreements but real impact inside Russia. Zygar reported that Kremlin figures believe the meeting proved Western leaders won’t mount decisive responses. “They think they have won,” Zygar said.
For the elites around Putin, surviving sanctions, adapting the economy and meeting the U.S. president on American soil while continuing the Ukraine war demonstrates Western divisions. If Moscow believes it can exploit that gap, the first test falls on NATO’s most exposed ground.
Russia’s military rebuild
Russia has been rebuilding forces facing the Baltics even while fighting in Ukraine. In 2023 the Kremlin re-established the Leningrad Military District, concentrating four armies along the western frontier, including the First Guards Tank Army, replenished with new armor from North Korea and Iran.
YOU MAY LIKE:Russia building new spy hub in Kaliningrad to target NATO communicationsPolitics
Kaliningrad remains the sharpest threat. The exclave fields Iskander ballistic missiles, S-400 air defense batteries, and Bastion coastal systems that could close Baltic skies and seas within minutes. Belarus provides the other flank, with Russian troops permanently stationed there for potential two-pronged thrusts across the Suwałki Gap, the narrow strip of Lithuania separating Belarus from the Russian exclave.
Large-scale Zapad exercises involving thousands of Russian and Belarusian troops, which were suspended in 2023 have resumed to test mobilization and airborne deployment in the area.
NATO’s reinforcement gap
NATO has pledged to transform the Baltic flank from a tripwire into a defended front, but reinforcement remains in transition. Germany has committed a 5,000-strong armored brigade to Lithuania, the first permanent foreign deployment since the Second World War, but full operation won’t come until 2027.
Canada leads the multinational brigade in Latvia, expanding with Danish and Swedish rotations, yet artillery and air defense components remain understrength. The U.K. has enlarged its Estonian presence but keeps the bulk of its armor in Britain.
Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership changes the calculus, adding modern air forces and northern depth, effectively making the Baltic Sea a NATO-controlled basin. As Oliver Moody argues in his book ‘Baltic: The Future of Europe’, “the best way to prevent a war is to be unmistakably capable of winning one.”
For now, Baltic states depend on promises taking years to materialize, while Russia’s force regeneration is already visible.
Baltic fortification
YOU MAY LIKE:Estonia digs anti-tank ditches to strengthen Baltic defensesPolitics
With this in mind, since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic states have rebuilt defenses rapidly. Lithuania reinstated conscription, raised spending above 2.5% of GDP, and began constructing the Baltic Defence Line along its eastern border. Estonia expanded territorial defense units designed to mobilize tens of thousands within hours. Latvia poured resources into border barriers and brought back mandatory military service after two decades.
All three are hardening critical infrastructure, cutting Russian energy reliance and strengthening cyber resilience. Synchronizing power grids with continental Europe, leaving the Soviet-era BRELL system, removes a lever of Russian coercion.
Leaders describe making the region a “porcupine,” too bristling with defenses to swallow.
The stakes of occupation
Soviet occupation of the three Baltic states started in 1940 and remains a painful memory: mass killings, deportations and forced exile. More than 200,000 people were sent to Siberia, 43,000 children taken from families and over 300,000 citizens fled west as the Red Army returned in 1944.
In a recent Financial Timesarticle, Baltic foreign ministers warned that even “temporary occupation is not a holding pattern; it is a programme of systematic destruction,” pointing to Russian-controlled Ukraine where the deportation of children, filtration camps, torture and mass graves have become a feature of life.
Baltic leaders want Western allies to understand that a Russian invasion threatens six million citizens who would face the same repression machinery.
Russian minority vulnerabilities
YOU MAY LIKE:Estonia says Russia-backed paramilitary group aimed to overthrow governmentPolitics
Russian-speaking minorities present another vulnerability Moscow has tried exploiting. Lithuania’s numbers are small and well-assimilated. Latvia and Estonia differ: roughly 38% of Latvians and 27% of Estonians are Russian-speaking, many descendants of Soviet-era migrants.
Since 2022, the Baltic states have moved decisively to close openings. Latvia banned Russian television channels, Estonia blocked pro-Kremlin websites and radio stations. Both removed Soviet monuments. Latvia formally banned May 9 Victory Day celebrations, with Estonia and Lithuania imposing similar restrictions.
Dr. hab. Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik of the Institute of Central Europe told Polish news site Onet that after an invasion, “the question would be loyalty. Would minorities stand with the state, remain passive, or support Russia.”
For now, the answer has been wary accommodation: no mass protests; surveys suggest Russian-speakers are cautious rather than openly pro-Kremlin.
Five scenarios
The most immediate risk is hybrid disruption. Baltic intelligence reports regular sabotage attempts, cyber intrusion, GPS jamming. Estonia traced arson attacks to Russian operatives, while NATO navies patrol undersea cables after unexplained damage.
A snap border provocation could see Russian “peacekeepers” appear in the Estonian town of Narva or the Latvian town of Daugavpils under minority protection pretexts. Such incursions might be deniable but would force NATO to decide on Article 5.
The Suwałki Gap presents crisis potential. The 65-kilometer strip could be sealed by coordinated moves from Kaliningrad and Belarus. RAND games found Russian armor could block the route within hours unless heavy reinforcements arrive fast.
A limited conventional grab might see Russian airborne units seize territory, then threaten nuclear escalation to freeze the situation. CSIS describes this as Moscow’s “most likely and most dangerous” move.
Full-scale assault on all three states could see capitals fall within 60 hours. NATO plans assume 48-72 hours for local forces to hold before allied brigades arrive.
For the Baltics, deterrence is the basic condition for survival. Three centuries ago Russia fought Sweden for these coasts. In 1940, Stalin’s troops marched in under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The question now is whether NATO’s preparations can break that cycle, or whether the Baltic story turns another Moscow-written page.
“A limited conventional grab might see Russian airborne units seize territory, then threaten nuclear escalation to freeze the situation.”
That was exactly the strategy when they thieved Crimea.
The nuclear threats worked.
The Scandinavian Air Force will bomb any invaders into ashes that come to the Baltic States. The Norwegian Navy recently ordered new battleships made in the UK. Denmark and Norway are also under a US nuclear shield. Putler would embarrass himself if he would try something in that area.