February 4, 2026

Germany’s support for Ukraine appears more than convincing. Berlin remains Kyiv’s largest European donor, both military and economic. The ruling coalition’s decision to increase funding for Ukraine in the 2026 budget to a record €11.5 billion only underscores this line: artillery, drones, armored vehicles, and Patriot missiles. At the same time, Germany is sharply increasing its own defense spending, preparing for a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO in the coming years.

But behind the façade of strategic resolve, internal tensions are increasingly evident. Germany remains deeply divided over its attitude toward Russia. Eastern Germany is significantly more skeptical about military aid to Ukraine, sanctions, and even the very interpretation of the causes of the war. Against this backdrop, the popularity of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is growing – a party that openly questions support for Kyiv, talks about restoring energy ties with Moscow, and is simultaneously accused of playing into the Kremlin’s hands.

At the same time, Germany is rapidly moving away from its role as a purely economic giant and preparing for the status of a full-fledged military power. Amid assessments of a possible conflict between Russia and NATO within two to three years, Berlin is sharply increasing defense spending, modernizing the Bundeswehr, and expanding its army. This rearmament is becoming not only a response to the Russian threat but also an attempt to transform Germany into a key military leader in the EU, disrupting the old balance of power in Europe.

In this configuration, Berlin is attempting to simultaneously serve as Europe’s leader, guarantor of security, and arbiter of internal conflicts. The only question is whether Germany has the political unity and strategic fortitude to maintain this balance—and what will happen to the Ukrainian issue if the internal pendulum swings in the other direction.

Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Center for East European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, shared his thoughts on these and other issues in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.

Germany is among the leaders in economic and military aid to Ukraine. For 2026, the ruling coalition has agreed to increase aid from €8.5 billion to €11.5 billion. Will this support continue to flow smoothly, or will there be obstacles, given that some political forces oppose continuing this process?

These figures do look impressive, but only given that Germany is Europe’s largest economy. It can objectively provide more assistance. For it, these aren’t such large sums. If you look at the ratio to GDP, Scandinavian and Baltic countries, for example, provide even more aid to Ukraine than Germany.

As for the problems associated with this aid, they do exist. One of them, as you rightly noted, is the political factor. This primarily concerns the right-wing populist, right-wing extremist Alternative for Germany party, which is particularly strong in the eastern states, former Soviet bloc territories. But there are also left-wing populist forces that view Germany as a country that should isolate itself from European and global processes, not help countries like Ukraine, and focus exclusively on its own problems. Unfortunately, this narrative is quite popular, especially in eastern Germany. This is one of the reasons why the issue of aid to Ukraine is politically sensitive. It is large in absolute terms, but not excessive for Germany.

Another problem is the limited capabilities of the German military-industrial complex itself. It is significantly less developed than that of the United States. This is why a significant portion of the American weapons supplied to Ukraine are actually purchased by countries like Germany and other European states in the United States.

Ukrainian refugees. How pressing is this issue for Germany? It’s no secret that there’s fatigue in Europe due to this factor. Chancellor Merz recently called on President Zelenskyy to ensure that young people remain in Ukraine and don’t leave for Germany, as the influx is growing. The ruling coalition has also introduced certain, albeit minor, restrictions on supporting Ukrainians who arrived earlier. How sensitive is this issue in German society today? Is there real fatigue with the presence of Ukrainians in Germany?

The issue of migration and refugees is a key one in Germany, as in other Western countries. But it concerns not only and not primarily Ukrainians, who are in a somewhat different category than migrants from the Middle East, Africa, or Asia. Therefore, there is no fundamentally antagonistic attitude toward Ukrainians. Of course, there are some negative sentiments, but Ukrainians are integrating much more quickly.

There’s also a factor of historical responsibility. Many Germans remember the crimes of the Wehrmacht and the SS in Ukraine, and this fosters a certain sense of responsibility today. Furthermore, Germans are well aware of what Russia is doing in Ukraine, and this contributes to a more tolerant attitude.

Until recently, there was another peculiarity: the first wave of Ukrainian refugees after the outbreak of full-scale war in 2022 received social support equal to that of German citizens, not the same as other refugee categories. This has now changed. Today, Ukrainians receive slightly less support than Germans, but somewhat more than other refugees. Indeed, there is currently increasing discussion about whether Germany should accept large numbers of Ukrainian men who could potentially remain in Ukraine and be mobilized. However, I don’t see any widespread or systemic negative sentiment against Ukrainian refugees.

Ukrainians are integrating very well into German society. They find jobs and contribute to the economy. This is also important for Germany, which, like most modern countries, faces a serious demographic problem. Solving this problem with migrants from Africa or Asia is more difficult because they integrate less well. Ukrainians, on the other hand, learn the language relatively quickly, get an education, and find employment.

– Ukraine’s EU membership. It’s been noted that even Trump’s so-called peace plan includes the idea of ​​an accelerated accession for Ukraine, supposedly as early as 2027. Friedrich Merz stated that 2027 is unrealistic and that Ukraine must go through all the procedures like other countries. How do the German authorities currently view the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU?

I think the American idea of ​​Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU arose from a lack of understanding of how the European Union functions. In the US, they often fail to realize that the EU is a completely different organization than NATO, where meeting the accession requirements is a relatively quick process. In the EU, however, legislation and the system of government must be fully adapted before accession. Therefore, this idea, although popular in Ukraine, unfortunately seems unrealistic.

Partial accession is being discussed, but I also have trouble seeing how that could work. Furthermore, the European Union formally has a mutual defense clause, similar to Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty. But the EU is not de facto established as a defense union. The problem is that if Ukraine were to join, this clause would automatically acquire a fundamentally different meaning. Before the war with Russia, the question of its practical application was virtually nonexistent. Now, however, it has become crucial. I can’t imagine Ukraine joining the EU and the bloc being willing to provide meaningful defense guarantees. Therefore, when Merz speaks of the unrealistic 2027 target, he most likely means the depth and duration of reforms—primarily in Ukraine’s legislation and public administration.

There’s a clear divide in Germany right now. The Chancellor assumes that dialogue with Putin is only possible after the war and “under certain conditions.” Meanwhile, dialogue with the Kremlin is being discussed not only in the pro-Russian AfD, but also in the SPD, where Merz is being urged to “show more courage and initiative on the Ukrainian issue” and propose direct negotiations with Putin. A simple question arises: what exactly should be restored and in what form?

“Here, in my view, the key question is what kind of dialogue and what should it be about. If we’re talking about finding compromises for the sake of a ceasefire, then I don’t think even Merz would be categorically opposed. But if we’re talking about restoring the cooperation between Russia and Germany that existed before 2022—a deep, broad relationship that, unfortunately, didn’t stop even in 2014—then that’s no longer possible.”

What I’m currently seeing in Germany is a massive rethinking of its previous policy toward Russia. And this concerns not just Merz or individual politicians, but society as a whole. More and more people are realizing that this policy was misguided and that cooperation with Russia in this format was a strategic mistake. I believe that this partnership, and I would even say a kind of “friendship” between Germany and Russia, will no longer exist. At least not until there is not just a change of president, but a change of regime in Russia itself. And perhaps even after the collapse of Russia as a state.

“But it’s obvious that Germany remains divided in its attitude toward Russia. The divide between East and West Germany persists even after decades of unification. Regarding attitudes toward Ukraine, residents of the eastern states are less inclined to support aid and more likely, so to speak, to justify Putin’s actions.”

This is perhaps a question more for psychologists or historians than for political scientists. But my interpretation is this. We’re talking more than 35 years after German reunification, and yet East German society remains less liberal in many respects. My interpretation is that certain characteristics—even those of pre-war Germany, up until 1945—have partially survived in the culture of the eastern states. As a result, today, approximately half of East Germans do not support aid to Ukraine and oppose sanctions against Russia.

There are other explanations: mistakes during unification, the Soviet experience, socioeconomic factors. But, in my view, the key one is the absence of the liberal transformation that occurred in the West in the late 1960s. It is this transformation that still divides East and West—not only on the issue of Ukraine or Russia, but also in a broader worldview.

Regarding Germany’s preparations for a possible Russian attack on NATO. In Europe, there’s increasing talk of a Russian attack on NATO in two to three years. Germany is announcing the modernization of the Bundeswehr, increasing its budget and troop levels. Is this real preparation, or is it still mostly just plans and declarations?

“There are real steps, but the problem is similar to the one with aid to Ukraine. Strong political forces remain in Germany that oppose rearmament. They believe the focus should be on the social system, education, and support for the poor, rather than investing in defense. Many Germans still harbor the notion that the wars in Europe occurred because Germany was aggressive before 1945, and that peace after 1945 was achieved precisely because Germany became pacifist. Hence the logic: if we remain peaceful, then they will leave us alone. This, incidentally, is very reminiscent of Ukrainian sentiments before 2014—they believed that if we don’t bother anyone, then they won’t bother us either. In Germany, unfortunately, this philosophy still persists among a significant portion of society.”

The second problem is the actual state of the Bundeswehr. For the past 30 years, it has been in dire straits. Restoring it requires large-scale reforms, significant investment, and, most importantly, time. Therefore, progress is slow, even though it’s already heading in the right direction.

– So, there is still political will to actually rearm and change Germany?

Yes. Despite pacifist sentiments, over 50% of the population now supports reform of the Bundeswehr and investments in defense. But these reforms are difficult to implement quickly. After the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr became an overly bureaucratic structure. There’s even a joke that the Bundeswehr is more afraid of an audit by its own government than by Russia. Efforts are underway to change this system, but the initial conditions were very challenging, so progress is slow.

How much tension could Germany’s rearmament create within the EU? For many years, Germany has been the EU’s wallet, and remains so. Now, it wants to get its hands on weapons, so to speak. This isn’t well received in France, given its history, nor in Poland. Could Germany’s rearmament really lead to internal conflicts in Europe if its army becomes the most powerful on the continent?

“It’s more of a schematic approach. Incidentally, it’s quite popular in the United States. For example, international relations theorist John Mearsheimer, in his book “The Tragedy of the Great Powers,” speculated back in 2001 that Germany’s rearmament could even lead to a French-Russian alliance against Berlin. But today, this logic seems outdated. The opposite is true. The Poles, the French, and the Italians would rather see a stronger Germany. They expect it to lead. The problem isn’t Germany’s strength, but its lack of military capability.”

Germany remains the EU’s wallet and, at the same time, a deeply pro-European country that supports the idea of ​​further integration of the European Union. Today, it is not perceived as a threat. Those days are in the past.

After winning the election, Merz immediately struck a different, tougher tone—not like Merkel or Scholz. He’s laying claim to European leadership, actively opposing both Putin and Trump. Is he truly capable of making Germany the political and security leader of the EU?

“I think that would be a good thing, and Merz was a pleasant surprise for me. He’s someone who came to German politics from the economic sphere, so I didn’t have high expectations. Besides, his biography includes previous statements regarding Russia—from a different era—that seemed, let’s say, rather odd. But now he’s proven himself a principled defender of European values, Ukraine, international law, and so on. And he truly is playing, both rhetorically and practically, what I would call a leadership role. At the same time, I wouldn’t exaggerate the importance of one country. Traditionally, Germany has always acted in cooperation with other states in the EU.”

The classic tandem was with France. Now, it’s perhaps changing somewhat. Italy has suddenly begun to play a more active role. It’s not entirely clear what will happen to the UK, which, after Brexit, is once again reconsidering its stance on the European Union.

Moreover, there are institutional mechanisms: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, where there are also individuals whose influence on common European policy is constantly growing. Therefore, I don’t think Merz will be able to act as a single leader. He will certainly play a rhetorical and political role, but the very mechanism of the European Union’s functioning is collective leadership. It is several countries that assume this role, not a single state, even one like Germany.

“But someone has to set the tone, even in the European Union. Collective action is a beautiful thing, but, as recent years have shown, it often fails in the EU. And even if you don’t take Hungary or Slovakia into account, everything is more or less clear there. There’s also the precedent of Belgium, which never agreed to the use of frozen assets. In short, the world has changed a lot, but it seems the EU still hasn’t.”

“It’s difficult to say. This is a new situation for the European Union, and the EU itself was not created for such conditions. It is, first and foremost, an economic union with a certain political superstructure. Defense and security issues have traditionally been the purview of NATO and the informal transatlantic alliance between Western Europe and the United States.”

I agree, the world has changed a lot, but the European Union still functions within the framework of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, when the old system was in place. Remaking or restructuring the EU is extremely difficult because it requires the consent of all member states. And now there are, so to speak, “dissidents” like Hungary, Slovakia, and perhaps eventually the Czech Republic. It’s not entirely clear what will happen to Austria or other countries.

I believe the so-called “coalition of the willing,” which has formed around support for Ukraine, could now play a role. It includes non-European countries—Japan, Australia, Canada, and others. Perhaps this coalition of democracies will represent the interests of the democratic world in the future. Incidentally, Hungary is not part of this coalition. And new formats of cooperation will likely emerge, especially since Europe increasingly needs non-European partners. If it isn’t the United States, then Japan, Australia, and Canada will play an increasingly important role.

Regarding the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right, pro-Russian party that, according to some polls, is leading the federal vote. How serious is the AfD for Germany today?

“I think this is one of the biggest problems for Germany, though not in the sense often imagined, where the AfD will become the governing party and even nominate a chancellor. I don’t think that will happen. The reason is Germany’s electoral system and the structure of the right-wing political spectrum. In fact, there is only one party that could theoretically become a coalition partner for the AfD at the federal level: the CDU, the Christian Democrats, and Merz’s party. But the CDU is unlikely to agree to such a coalition, as it would mean an internal split and the de facto dissolution of the party.”

The AfD could only become a governing party if it underwent a fundamental transformation, as happened with the Sweden Democrats. In Sweden, the party began as a right-wing extremist, even neo-Nazi, force, but over time it evolved into a right-wing conservative force with which center-right parties now cooperate. This is not yet evident in Germany. Therefore, the AfD will remain a problem for German politics, likely entering state governments in some regions, but it will have no direct influence on federal government policy. An attempt to ally with it would lead to a serious rift within the CDU itself. The only scenario in which this could be possible is if the AfD itself transforms into a different party, in particular if it changes its position on Ukraine and Russia.

– The AfD is receiving conflicting signals from party leaders: Weidel criticizes contacts with Russia, while Chrupalla calls Putin “normal” and denies any threat. There are also suggestions of returning gas and withdrawing aid to Ukraine. Is this shift in rhetoric from some parts of the party an attempt to appeal to voters in western states?

“There are indeed a variety of voices there. But right now, the pro-Russian wing is the one wielding the most influence. At the same time, there are politicians, including Alice Weidel herself, who increasingly recognize this as a serious problem for the party’s development. She understands that a pro-Russian stance is blocking the possibility of a coalition with the CDU.”

Chrupalla is an East German politician, and he reflects the sentiments of a significant portion of AfD voters in East Germany. For many of them, Putin and modern Russia symbolize a past, a supposed order when “everything was clear,” and there were no immigrants or chaos. They project their own frustrations onto Putin. Therefore, the AfD’s pro-Russian leanings have not disappeared.

Energy cooperation between Germany and Russia. You said that a return to political cooperation before 2022 is impossible. But such calls are being heard not only from the AfD, but also from individual voices within the SPD. They say the German economy is sagging, American restrictions under Trump are hurting industry, and cheap energy resources are needed. Is this fundamentally impossible, or is it still hypothetically possible in a few years?

“I see this as possible only if there is regime change in Russia. I cannot imagine cooperation with a Russian regime that retains imperial ambitions. Yes, there is a certain natural economic complementarity between Russia and Germany—resources on one side and technology on the other. But this is only possible with a completely different Russia.”

– Is the statement about the 70 billion that the AfD wants to “return” from Ukraine pure populism or a definite threat?

“It’s populism. There’s no legal basis for it, because most of this aid wasn’t loans. But it’s easy to sell people on the idea that the money was “given to strangers” instead of being spent on their own schools, infrastructure, or children.”

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