Oct 15, 2024
Wild Hornets
There are few manned jets flying over Ukraine, but an air war is being fought out with a huge impact in what happens below. Ukrainian interceptors are steadily blinding Russia’s reconnaissance capabilities, preventing them from carrying out long-range attacks.
Russia is starting to find ways to fight back but the interceptors are getting more capable too in a technological arms race. It is a vital struggle not just for this war but for future conflicts.
The Long Punch
Ukrainian air defenses, from Patriot missiles to new F-16s, mean Russian aircraft cannot operate over Ukraine, but instead they throw precision-guided glide bombs from long range. The Russians sometimes launch as many as a hundred bombs in one day, the largest of them weighing over three tons.
At the same time, Russia is using its still-massive advantage in heavy artillery to pound Ukrainian positions, and carrying out strikes far behind the lines with Lancet loitering munitions.
Getty Images
All of these attacks rely on precise intelligence about the Ukrainian positions provided by ubiquitous drones. Russia has a mixed fleet of Orlan-10 and -30, ZALA, SuperCam drones and others, each assigned to a specific role guiding airstrikes, artillery or loitering munitions.
These small, fixed-wing drones are difficult to down. Flying at high altitude they are virtually invisible and have a smaller radar and infra-red signature than manned aircraft, and are too numerous to be brought down with Ukraine’s limited stocks of anti-aircraft missiles. But sometimes tactical necessity requires shooting down a $100k Orlan-10 with a $480k Stinger missile.
But in recent months Ukraine has adapted its FPV drones, normally used to take out tanks, artillery and other ground targets, into high-altitude interceptors. The $700 racing quadcopters can now hit scout drones at 12,000 feet and they are scoring a growing number of kills.
This ability to take out Russian eyes in the sky could completely change the situation the ground. For example, there is some evidence that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was able to gain ground rapidly because they had blitzed Russian scout drones leaving the Russians unable to track or target the attack force.
Escalating Interceptions
Back in August, Wild Hornets released a video showing more than 100 drone interceptions. In a recent post they say their tally is now up to more than 300 with a success rate of over 50%.
On October 11th, drone fundraiser Serhii Sternenko noted that the 1129th Belotserk anti-aircraft missile regiment had brought down 145 Russian reconnaissance drones in “a short period” while The Times talked to a Ukrainian specialize marine unit which had intercepted more than 50 drones.
Serhii Sternenko
Intercepts have been easy because the scout drones are sitting ducks. Once the drone is spotted on radar, the FPV pilot can fly to the air and approach from above and behind. The scout operator, all their attention at the ground below, has no idea they are under attack until the Ukrainian drone slams into them.
Some Russian operators resorted to daubing their planes with abusive graffiti (“Whoever shoots this down is a f****r”) but some have taken more practical steps. Ukrainian electronic warfare expert Serhii Flash noted frantic discussions on Russian Telegram channels about how to cope with the threat, including a number of technical solutions which have been implemented in the last few weeks.
Defensive Measures
Most drones are a basic white color. This makes them hard to see from below as they merge with the light sky or cloud, but highly visible from above. Camouflage paint schemes, which reduce the distance at which drones can be seen, were seen occasionally before, now they seem to be applied as standard at the factory.
ZALA
The first defensive measures to appear in Russian reconnaissance drones were small backward-facing cameras. These giving the drone operator at least minimal warning that they are under attack, and give them a chance to carry out evasive maneuvers or leave the area. FPV drones have limited flight endurance, so if the scout can survive for a few minutes they may be able to outlast the attacker.
Serhii Flash
Some Russian drones are now also fitted with jammers as Serhii Flash predicted. One example, described by analyst Roy on Twitter/X, scans for the presence of video signals. A strong video signal is likely to be from an approaching FPV interceptor, and when one is detected the system emits a jamming signal at the same frequency. This blots out the interceptor pilot’s signal when they get close.
Several different versions of jammer have been fitted. All of these look like improvised field installations rather than coming from the manufacturers, again demonstrating the importance of being able to react quickly to developments in drone warfare.
Flash mentions several other proposed Russian defensive aids, from net guns to trailing streamers which foul the rotors of an attacking drone, which have not been seen yet. Either these are more challenging to implement, or they have not passed tests. The intense Darwinian nature of drone warfare means that any defensive ‘mutation’ which works is likely to appear and proliferate fast as the drones which lack it quickly succumb to predators.
The Drone V Drone Future
Another development which should come as no surprise is that the Russians are now adopting the same tactics. We do not know if they have succeeded in integrating FPV operations with air defence radar and command-and-control as Ukraine has, but we are certainly starting to see videos of Russian FPVs bringing down Ukrainian scouts.
Meanwhile Wild Hornets are raising funds for next-generation FPVs which are faster and even more capable, while also working on interceptors to hit Shaheds. Future versions are likely to feature optical homing for terminal guidance, already used against ground targets, to nullify any jamming.
It is only a matter of time before, paralleling the development of military biplanes in WW1, we started to see dedicated FPV fighters emerge which will not only bring down enemy drones but also counter the FPVs on the other side. The drone air war will become a contest in its own right.
This contest has at least three possible outcomes.
One is that defence gets ahead, and reconnaissance operations continue as at present, but with a steady rate of losses. The battlefield will continue to be under constant surveillance by both sides.
Another is that offence will triumph, and neither side will be able to keep scout drones in their air. The omnipresent eye on the sky will disappear and operations will return to the pre-drone age.
The third and most likely situation is that one side will gain drone air superiority over the other. The winners will see and target the enemy, while remaining invisible and untouchable to long-range strikes from missiles, glide bombs and long-range drones. Perhaps worse, the losers will face heavy and continuing attrition of their ground forces from attacking FPVs without being able to strike in return.
Air power has always been important, not a different sort of air power may dictate the outcome of the ground war.
(Nobody in the West has yet proposed putting defensive measures on small scout drones like the U.S. RQ-11B Raven. With the normal procurement process, implementation would likely take years.)
The new contest in the skies may look like a battle of toys. But winner is likely to take all and the stakes could hardly be higher.
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