09/27/2026

No single percentage can tell you whether Russia’s nuclear arsenal actually works. Two years ago, I estimated 50% of Russia’s roughly 4,400 warheads were functional; since then, Russia’s newest ICBM has destroyed its own launch silo during testing, while older systems like the Yars have launched successfully multiple times.

I break down every link in Russia’s nuclear strike chain: warhead, missile, command authentication, delivery, and explain why “enough” matters more than any clean number, and why deterrence doesn’t require Russia’s arsenal to be anywhere near perfect.

Join the channel as a member! We’re building a global community of people who are passionate about Ukrainian victory, honoring NATO alliances, and dislike dictators as much as I do: https://www.youtube.com/@WesODonnellX

Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the heroes. Crimea is Ukraine.

• Chapters!
• 00:00 – Reassessing the 50% Estimate of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal
• 01:09 – Recent Missile Tests: Failures, Successes, and the State of Russia’s Nuclear Forces
• 02:16 – The Nuclear Strike Chain: From Politics to Warhead
• 03:18 – Assessing the Condition of Russian Nuclear Warheads
• 04:27 – Tritium, Plutonium Pits, and Maintenance Implications
• 05:09 – Russia’s Ongoing Tritium Production and Warhead Maintenance Infrastructure
• 05:48 – Why Nuclear Reliability Matters to the Kremlin
• 06:17 – Missile Test Evidence: Sarmat Setbacks and Yars Progress
• 08:06 – Operational Strategic Missile Launches Provide Positive Evidence
• 09:03 – Diverse Reliability Across Generations of Nuclear Systems
• 09:24 – Triad Redundancy: Submarines, Bombers, and Land Missiles
• 10:03 – Beyond Percentages: Reliability, Data Gaps, and Qualitative Assessment
• 11:43 – Corruption, Sanctions, and Modernization: Evidence Limitations
• 12:04 – Deterrence Through Uncertainty Amid Massive System Failures
• 13:17 – Testing, Credibility, and the Shifting Assessment of Arsenal Reliability
• 13:53 – Partial Failures, Systemic Issues, and Ongoing Functionality 15:15 – Balancing Terror and Complacency: Assessing Russia’s Nuclear Threat
• 16:26 – Observing Capability, Questioning Claims, and Deterrence Tolerance
• 16:50 – Closing Remarks and Support for Ukraine