12.06.2025
Ukraine is carrying out long-range strikes with Ukrainian-made drones against air bases and defense industry facilities in the Russian Federation.
In total, at least 32 military facilities and facilities of the Russian military-industrial complex were hit in April and May 2025. One of the latest strikes was on June 12 against the Rezonit enterprise , which produces electronics for radar systems, electronic warfare, UAVs, and navigation. And on June 11, the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, a critical enterprise in the production of Russian gunpowder, was attacked , as well as a number of other military facilities.
Before that, there were attacks on military airfields. For example, on June 9, 2025, the Savasleyka airbase was attacked 600 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, one MiG-31K, a carrier of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, and another unidentified aircraft, the Su-30/34, were destroyed. Before that, on June 6, the Engels-2 airfield was attacked, the base of Russian strategic bombers, from which cruise missiles are launched against Ukraine.
It is worth noting that the strikes on these air bases took place at the time they were being used by Russian aircraft. Thus, during the strike by Ukrainian drones on Engels-2, a missile attack using Russian bombers continued, which could not land at the airfield for several hours due to the Ukrainian strike and the fire caused by it. And during the attack on Savasleyki, the Russians used Russian aircraft from this air base to launch four Kinzhal missiles. The Ukrainian military is very likely to have the necessary operational intelligence information to launch strikes at a critical moment. This is when Russian strategic aviation is equipped with missiles and is preparing to attack Ukrainian cities. However, due to the technical complexity of drone operations and possible delays, Russian aviation often manages to avoid a strike at the last moment.
Last year, in an analytical article for the leading international military publication “War on the Rocks”, the UCBS noted the strategic need to strike at long-range targets in the rear of the Russian Federation, primarily at the bases of aircraft, missile carriers and aerial bombs. In particular, due to the fact that at that time a window of opportunity was open and Russia was not ready to effectively protect its airfields, for example, in most cases there were no banal shelters for aircraft.
Thus, the material noted the need for Ukrainian partners to support long-range strikes by supplying the appropriate nomenclature, and most importantly, demonstrating political will and lifting restrictions on hitting targets in Russia.
Despite the lifting of restrictions from partners in the fall of 2024, primarily from the United States, this step turned out to be largely belated, and was rather a reaction by Washington to the situation on the front and the political challenges facing President Joe Biden’s administration on the eve of the elections.
The shortage of Western long-range weapons contributed to the development of Ukraine’s own missile program and the mass production of “deep-strike” drones. In almost the last two years, the Ukrainian defense industry has managed to achieve significant results in the production of long-range drones, and most importantly, to scale this process in 2024 by 22 times compared to 2022. Which, in turn, allowed the Ukrainian Defense Forces to increase fire damage and strike military facilities deep into Russian territory – at a distance of more than 1 thousand kilometers.
While Ukraine was proving its right to long-range strikes on Russian territory and building up its own capabilities, time was lost that benefited the Kremlin.
Taking advantage of this delay, as well as transferring the economy to military rails, the Russians were able to establish production facilities not only in remote regions of the Russian Federation, but also in the regions bordering Ukraine. Manufacturing various components, in particular for attack UAVs of the “Shahed” type, missile and other aviation weapons. No less important is that during this time Moscow began equipping border air bases with protective hangars and other fortifications in order to reduce the risks of damage and destruction of aircraft. Thus, at the “Khalino” airfield in Kursk, reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft were seen in satellite images for June 2025. Similar shelters appeared at the “Saki” airbase in the temporarily occupied Crimea.
Despite new challenges, Ukraine in 2025 continues to effectively destroy Russian military targets, transferring the war to the territory of the Russian Federation in order to stop aggression, and most importantly, demilitarize Moscow.
However, continued support from Western partners remains vital for Kyiv. It is focused on two key areas: weakening Russia and strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities. The first area includes strengthening sanctions against the Russian Federation and its allies who supply weapons or facilitate the circumvention of restrictions – that is, undermining Russia’s economic, industrial and production potential. The second is strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities to continue resisting the aggressor.
If the supply of Western long-range systems is politically sensitive, partners can choose an alternative: invest in the production of high-tech Ukrainian weapons that have already proven their effectiveness and are able to replace expensive imported analogues.
Supporting Ukraine’s defense industry is a strategic investment in the security of all of Europe. It not only strengthens Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, but also contributes to the long-term goal of weakening Russia’s military potential and reducing threats to Europe.
Give Ukraine enough funds and send back its adult males and Ukraine will do a lot more good things, which means 2,000,000 dead cockroaches.