07/27/2025
The temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula has recently been regularly visited by Ukrainian drones, which arrange incendiary nights at various facilities of the Russian occupation forces. In fact, we are now watching how Crimea is gradually turning into a kind of island analogue of Chornobayvka* for the invaders.
More details about how and why this happens can be found in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance” .
Everything is connected.
Just the other day, we were able to watch as the resorts of Sochi and Adler experienced a visit from “good drones” for the first time in a long time. As a result, strikes were carried out on the facilities of Kubannefteproduct and Lukoil-Yugnefteproduct .
The Russian air defense, represented by the 1721st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, which is armed with the S-350 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, which “have no analogues in the world,” failed to cope with the task of intercepting small air objects. However, it successfully gave its compatriots nightmares with unserviceable anti-aircraft missiles falling from the sky.
Attentive readers will, of course, ask: what’s the point of Sochi and Adler if the article is about Crimea? It’s simple: through WHY airspace were Ukrainian strike drones heading to Russian territory? Absolutely right, through the airspace of Ukrainian Crimea, which in the fourth year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has turned into a sieve.
And this happened thanks to consistent, systematic work both on the destruction of important military facilities on the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula, and on the detection and elimination of air defense positions.
Systematic hunting
Recently, we saw another batch of video footage of the destruction by the GUR unit of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Crimean peninsula of the Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, Niobium-SV and Protyvnik-GE radars, as well as a Su-30 fighter at the Saki airfield.
Such raids are carried out regularly and leave the Russian occupiers virtually no chance of safely deploying and keeping their anti-aircraft missile systems and radar stations on duty. And there are fewer and fewer of them every day, as are the airspace control zones.
Every month, Russia loses from 25 to 35 air defense systems , and up to a third of them, and sometimes more, are losses on the Crimean peninsula, which urgently need to be compensated. And there is practically no compensation for air defense losses through production in Russia at the moment and it has to be carried out exclusively by transferring them from other positional areas, thus exposing the airspace in the TOT areas of mainland Ukraine, but more often – over Russia itself.
Crimea is now turning into a kind of Chornobayvka for Russian air defense – and here’s why.
The peninsula has an area of just over 26 thousand sq. km. To cover the airspace, the Russian occupiers have deployed the 31st Air Defense Division there, consisting of the 12th (positional area of Yevpatoria and Sevastopol) and 18th anti-aircraft missile regiments (positional area of Dzhankoy, Feodosia and Tarkhankut), as well as the 3rd radio engineering regiment (Tarkhankut). It would seem that at first glance everything is done according to the book, there is nothing to complain about, but in reality – no.
Crimean air defense is much more vulnerable to threats from mainland Ukraine than, for example, that deployed on mainland Russia.
This vulnerability is due to the fact that Russian anti-aircraft missile regiments are equipped mainly with sectoral radars 92N2E, which are inferior in terms of fixing and tracking small targets. For such purposes, all-round radars 91N6E are used, and with them the Russian troops have the most acute shortage. Attempts to compensate for this shortage of “Nebo-M” and “Kasta-2E2” end with the rather rapid destruction of these radars, which forces them to compensate in emergency mode, transferring them from other areas.
Thus, the ROV have found themselves in an Ouroboros cycle, when they need to cover an important logistical hub in the form of the Crimean peninsula , where a large number of key military facilities are located, but it is impossible to do this effectively, even physically, let alone technologically.
So it turned out that the Crimean peninsula is turning into another Chornobayvka for the Russian Federation. True, it is much larger in area, but absolutely similar in essence.
Nowhere to run
The fatal feature of Crimea for the Russians is that it is a completely closed area. That is, all positional areas are known in advance – both the locations that are most conducive to the placement of air defense assets, and vice versa. In fact, the air defense zones in Crimea are limited by the borders of the peninsula itself.
Of course, someone can cite Israel as an example, which is similar to Crimea in terms of area and how echeloned air defense is organized there. But the difference between them is that in Israel the echeloning is denser and more intense, and the interception systems that are used are high-tech, modern. And so – they have no analogues in the world.
For their part, on the Crimean peninsula, the Russian occupiers continue to squint with sectoral radars. Such a closed ecosystem, let’s call it that, has practically no chance of survival. There are only periods of convulsions in endless agony.
And within this ecosystem, transport hubs are concentrated, supporting primarily the Dnipro naval base through Crimea and, in general, the cover of the entire left-bank Kherson bridgehead, as well as means of terror – the same launch pads for Shahed-136 kamikaze drones from Cape Chauda and 9M723/KN23 ballistic missiles.
Among other things, the peninsula provides intelligence activities towards mainland Ukraine using both ground and aerial surveillance equipment.
Therefore, regular raids on the peninsula are an integral part of ensuring the security of mainland Ukraine – by reducing Crimea’s defenses and turning its airspace into a passageway.
The Russian command also understands that reducing the level of protection of Crimea’s airspace may lead to the fact that at some point it will be open not only to drones, but also to combat aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force. And this is what the Russian occupiers fear most, because the appearance of enemy aircraft in the air is a sure way to losing control over the land territory as well.
That is, the beating of the occupation troops on the peninsula, which we can now observe, has the same meaning as their beating in 2022 in the notorious Chornobayvka, only significantly stretched in time, but with an unchanged ultimate goal.
Conclusions
Regular drone strikes over Crimea perform an important task – the systematic depletion of Russian air defense. The peninsula was and continues to be considered the second most echeloned after the Moscow region. And to maintain this level, the DOV command has to constantly compensate for the losses of Russian air defense.
In a sense, drone strikes over Crimea pursue not a tactical or even an operational-tactical goal, but in a sense a strategic one. The goal is to exhaust Russian air defenses to such an extent that the occupation forces will not be able to provide airspace cover not only over the temporarily occupied territories, but also over Russia itself.
In addition, all these raids are gradually turning Crimea into a dangerous rear area that could provide a wide range of tasks without any particular risks. And if the peninsula is losing its importance as a safe rear area, why allocate critically scarce resources to its protection and cover?
And judging by the results and growing effectiveness of the raids on Russia, the goals are being achieved. Strictly according to plan.
*As a reminder, In the first days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces took control of the village and its airfield. The airbase was strategically important for Russian forces and their war effort. During the months of occupation, Ukraine launched numerous attacks and airstrikes on Russian forces within the village, destroying Russian equipment and killing Russian personnel. The village “achieved legendary status” for Ukrainians due to the extent of losses Russia took in the small village again and again. Wikipedia
Keeping control of the Crimea posses a huge strain on the occupiers. If that bridge should ever get destroyed, it would fall relatively fast.
If Ukraine ever received the missiles capable of destroying it. So far, the timid West refuse to supply the real firepower in case it upset putler.
The cowardice in the West is so deep-seated, it’ll take a whole new generation to get rid of it.
“There are only periods of convulsions in endless agony.” – included in my nightly prayers.
I hear ya, Mike.
I remember before the war started in 14 the Russians convinced them selves NATO was determined to gain control of Ukraine just so they could made Sevastopol an NATO naval base.
I could not convince them that Sevastopol was indefensible. It was to close to the front lines and supplies could be easily interdicted.
Crimea and the port a like a pinnata dangling into the Black Sea and like a pinnate it was begging to be whacked with a stick.
But you know them, they think that if they want something everybody else does too.
Now they can not even base their
I doubt it was ever about NATO. If they didn’t have evil intentions and a backward imperialistic mindset, they could’ve joined NATO themselves, or just tolerate it. NATO is a defensive organization, and nowhere does it say anything about starting a war in its statutes.
But, in the end, nobody really knows what exactly moved the dwarf vampire to steal the peninsula, I suppose. If he were Biden or Hegseth, the whole planet would know.