
14 September 2026

For decades, the Russian economy has been experiencing a massive outflow of capital abroad, which has exceeded 100% of GDP over the past quarter century, according to calculations by the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting (CMAF), a government-affiliated think tank.
According to CMASF estimates, over the past 10 years, Russia’s real sector has lost 3% of GDP annually due to capital outflow. The overall outflow from the economy has averaged 4-5% of GDP per year over the past three decades.
According to data from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF), Russia experienced record capital flight in 2022: more than 12% of GDP “flowed” abroad amid the withdrawal of Western companies and the emigration of hundreds of thousands of citizens, who took with them savings and proceeds from the sale of assets.
More than 10% of the country’s GDP “leaked” annually in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the first wave of Western sanctions. Russia experienced a comparable outflow—also around 10% of GDP—only during the global financial crisis of 2008-09.
“The net capital outflow from the domestic real sector is chronic, having been observed for several decades. Together with the net outflow of investment income from the real sector, it fluctuates steadily within 4-5% of GDP,” the CMASF report states. Cumulatively, for 2001-2025, the outflow from the real sector exceeded 110% of GDP, and from the economy as a whole, 130% of GDP.
“In 2025, due to a decrease in net payments of investment income abroad by enterprises, this indicator will decline to less than 2% of GDP. However, it is still unclear how sustainable this change is,” the experts note.
These figures are high by global standards for countries with comparable income levels, CMASF emphasizes. For example, in Hungary, Slovakia, and Thailand, net capital outflow remains below 1% of GDP per year; in Argentina and South Africa, it is below 0.5% of GDP; while Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, India, and Brazil experience net capital inflows.

The Russian Central Bank, which previously published statistics on private sector capital outflow, classified them shortly after the war began. Its historical data, however, shows that cumulative capital outflow from Russia reached $780.8 billion between 2001 and 2021. This is 65.77 trillion rubles at the current exchange rate—an amount 1.5 times greater than the annual federal budget (44 trillion rubles) and greater than the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves ($769 billion as of September 1). According to the Central Bank, capital outflow from Russia amounted to $907.4 billion over the 27 years since 1994, and has likely exceeded $1 trillion by now.
Net (after deducting liabilities) assets of the non-financial sector accumulated abroad over the past 30 years exceed 40% of Russia’s current GDP, according to a report from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF). This represents approximately 85 trillion rubles, or $1 trillion in monetary terms. “Some of these assets are undoubtedly related to production processes—they ensure control over infrastructure elements and production chains located abroad, serve as collateral for transactions, provide access to technological solutions, and so on. At the same time, it is clear that, given such a scale and such consistency, a significant portion of these investments is excessive relative to production needs,” the CMASF experts write.
Previously withdrawn assets, they believe, can be used “to recreate complete production chains within Russia.” To curb capital outflow, the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) proposes taxing Russian companies’ foreign assets and amnestying funds withdrawn from Russia, imposing a fixed fee for their return to the country.
