18.05.2026
The 1st Army Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Azov” in April published a video that recorded
drone strikes on Russian logistics in the area of temporarily occupied Donetsk – at a depth of 60 to 70 km from the line of combat clashes. And already in May, “Azov” demonstrated strikes on the logistics of the occupiers
in the area of temporarily occupied Mariupol , which is 120 km from the LBZ! And this caused a real panic among the Russian invaders.
The role of logistics, the provision of advanced units, is one of the most important elements that affect the success of a particular military operation. It was the failure to provide Russian troops with the first months of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that determined the further outcome of the battles for Kyiv, the Kharkiv region, and Kherson.
To the extent possible, the Defense Forces of Ukraine tried during each period of the war to influence the level of support for the occupation forces in order to undermine both their offensive potential and, in a number of cases, their defensive potential. At the same time, such influence was adaptive in nature – both on our side and on the enemy’s.
For example, when Ukraine received high-precision M142 HIMARS MLRS, which allowed the SOU to deliver precision strikes several dozen kilometers deep into the enemy’s rear area, the ROV began to move both warehouses and command posts deeper into the rear. Logistics was disrupted for a while, became more complicated, but over time, it also adapted to new conditions.
For almost all of these more than four years since the start of the full-scale invasion, we have been in a state of finding methods to neutralize the enemy’s logistics at such a level and to such a depth that he has no opportunity to adapt to the new conditions. And it seems that Ukraine is approaching the moment when it will have the opportunity to implement such a plan.
Hunting 120 km from the LBZ
The issue of controlling the enemy’s logistics has long been hampered by the technical and technological capabilities of reaching the rear depth limit of 15-20 kilometers. To a large extent, this problem was solved by fiber-optic FPV drones, which made it possible to overcome distances of up to 40 km and even a record 50 km. But these were rather exceptional cases than regular ones.
In addition, for a fiber optic FPV drone forced to drag a tail of several tens of kilometers of fragile material, there was not only the threat of being shot down, but also of a channel break due to cable damage.
But the real thunder in the clear sky were the shots of the strikes of the 1st AK NGU “Azov” on Russian logistics in the Donetsk area, and then Mariupol. Some time later, the Russian Z-military began to complain about the appearance of Ukrainian drones in the area of the M-14 highway.
Until recently, this was indeed one of the safest logistical land arteries from the territory of Russia, the mainland of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, to Crimea. In addition, the M-14 highway connects Mariupol with Berdyansk, and from there, along the N-30, it leads to Tokmak, as well as Melitopol.
In fact, the risk zone can be considered the Mariupol-Mangush-Berdyansk section, 80 km long, which is located at a distance from the LBZ, depending on the location, from 80 to 120 km.
According to information published in open sources, Hornet attack drones (equipped with Starlink terminals) are flying to Mariupol , which, according to the announced performance characteristics, allow them to operate at distances of up to 160 km, and according to some reports, their maximum flight range may be 200 km.
This is quite enough to launch and control systematic raids from the rear area outside the LBZ into such a deep rear of the temporarily occupied territories.
In addition, reconnaissance activities in this area are carried out by Leleka-100 UAVs.
It is obvious that these opportunities to influence Russian logistics, locked by the coast of the Sea of Azov and limited to a width of 80-120 km, will scale up in the near future, which will lead to the loss of reliable supply to the advanced units of the Russian Navy and the corresponding consequences.
Consequences
It is easy to guess that even not a complete loss, but a slowdown and restriction of logistics in such a deep rear will have an extremely negative impact on the supply of the occupiers’ advanced units. And, as a result, not only on their ability to conduct offensive operations, but even to defend.
If each SOU formation includes a unit responsible for a certain square at a depth of 80-120 km from the line of combat contact, we can talk about a quick, complete collapse of the support of the Southern Donbass and the entire Southern bridgehead of the ROV.
And these trends should be considered not only in the context of Donetsk and Mariupol, the southwestern part of Donetsk region, or the temporarily occupied part of Zaporizhia region.
In 2022, the ROV were forced to flee from the right bank of the Kherson region precisely because of the complete collapse of logistics from the left to the right bank of the Dnieper. From the first HIMARS strike on the Antonivskyi Bridge on July 19, 2022, to the escape of the Russian group of troops “Dnieper” from the right bank on November 11, less than three months passed.
It would seem that this allowed them, leaving behind a bridgehead that was as inconvenient to hold as possible, to gain a foothold in the more stable, especially in terms of logistics, left-bank part of the Kherson region. But this impression is imaginary and deceptive.
The fact is that the Russian Dnieper Military District, with a strength of slightly more than 130 thousand personnel, has to be responsible for a zone that includes the left-bank part of the Kherson region and part of Zaporizhzhia, with a total area of over 34 thousand square kilometers.
Today, this is the largest area of control distributed over such a small group of troops!
In general, the bulk of the Dnieper coalfield is concentrated along the left bank of the Dnieper and is mainly stretched along the coast. In the Zaporizhia region, the main concentration zone is the LBZ and the ZNPP area. The rest of the temporarily occupied south, roughly speaking, is a rolling field.
Logistics are also pretty bad for the DOV in this area of responsibility.
Firstly, it is limited. The main route to Oleshki is M-17, to Hola Prystan is R-57, the Kakhovka district is R-47 and M-14 along the left bank of the Dnieper.
Secondly, all these arteries, given the range of possible operation of Ukrainian drones, completely fall into the risk zone.
In particular:
M-17 – from Oleshki to Armyansk (Crimea), depth 90 km;
R-57 – from Holaya Prystan to Skadovsk, depth 60 km;
R-47 – from Kakhovka to Novooleksiyevka, the depth is 110 km, and to Genichesk, 120 km;
M-14 – generally located from the left bank of the Dnieper at a depth of 9 km to 70 km to Melitopol.
That is, in the case of scaling up the use of precisely this tactic of influencing the enemy’s logistics, it is quite realistic for a group of troops, which is extremely limited in its capabilities, to lose control over southern Ukraine.
It is also noteworthy that I cited the example of Kherson and Zaporizhia regions exclusively for clarity, while such tactics have their own specific implementation for each individual temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine. And not only that. After all, in the same way, the SOU will later be able to take control of the logistics in depth in the territory of Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod and other regions of the Russian Federation.
The only question is in terms of scaling these capabilities and expanding control of the small sky at a depth of 15-30 kilometers from the LBZ to a depth of up to 120 km.
The collapse of logistics at such depths will lead to the collapse of the enemy’s defenses both on the TOT and, in the future, to the loss of control even over the small skies of the Russian Federation itself.
But it should be understood that this process is not fast and takes time to catalyze. On the other hand, the beginning of this process has been laid.
I hope that this can be expanded and kept upright for the required amount of time to dry out the enemy’s supplies along the frontline and in the immediate rear. A starving cockroach is not nearly as effective and is closer to death for the AFU, especially one without ammo.
“The collapse of logistics at such depths will lead to the collapse of the enemy’s defenses both on the TOT and, in the future, to the loss of control even over the small skies of the Russian Federation itself.”
God willing!
The rat nazi has informed his subordinate piss-stain that he will take all Donbas this summer and impose even more absurd capitulation terms.
I hope that instead the horde of putinaZi savages will be pushed back and start to go splatt in ever bigger numbers.
As Gary Kasparov says :
“Only Trump can save Putin now.”