Trump’s ‘Article 5-Lite’ for Ukraine Is Dead End, New Report Warns

A Washington think tank argues that vague security promises won’t stop Putin – advocating instead for an “armed nonalignment” model to secure Kyiv’s future.

by  Alex Raufoglu | Dec. 17, 2025,

US President Donald Trump hosts a multilateral meeting with European leaders at the White House on Monday, Aug 18, 2025. (Photo by Andrea Hanks /White House)

CONTENT

• Why “Article 5-lite” falls short
• Nonaligned, not isolated
• Porcupine defense
• Reassurance without promise to fight
• The force – and the price tag
• Built for political reality

WASHINGTON DC – As the Trump administration tests the idea of offering Ukraine vague, “Article 5-like” security assurances in exchange for a negotiated end to Russia’s war, a new report from a Washington defense think tank argues the proposal is neither credible nor durable – and lays out an alternative designed to survive Moscow’s objections and Western political limits.

The US administration’s trial balloon, floated this week, envisions security guarantees short of NATO membership to reassure Kyiv after a peace deal. But such commitments would lack the legal force of the alliance’s collective defense clause, face deep skepticism in Europe, and almost certainly be rejected by Russia outright, according to analysts.

In Washington, they would also depend on future administrations choosing to honor promises that Congress has never ratified.

Against that backdrop, Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank, is advancing a different postwar model: Armed nonalignment – a framework that trades formal guarantees for a self-defense strategy backed by sustained but conditional Western support.

“Determining arrangements for Ukraine’s postwar security will be a critically important element of a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war,” Kavanagh said. Any lasting settlement, she argued, must address Kyiv’s fear of renewed Russian aggression while also accounting for Moscow’s opposition to NATO expansion and the political and resource constraints facing the United States and Europe.

That combination, she argued, leaves little room for alliance-style commitments.

Why “Article 5-lite” falls short

Russia is likely to insist on two red lines in any settlement: No NATO membership for Ukraine and no foreign forces stationed on its territory.

Kavanagh said that these are demands the West is unlikely to challenge indefinitely – particularly without broad public support or treaty backing.

Offering alliance-like assurances without an alliance, she suggests, risks creating expectations the United States and Europe cannot meet if political winds shift.

“Armed nonalignment is the most feasible approach to Ukraine’s postwar security because it can ensure Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and deter aggression while addressing Russia’s security concerns and accounting for political and resource constraints in the United States and Europe,” the report argues.

Nonaligned, not isolated

Under the proposal, Ukraine would remain formally outside NATO but far from cut off. Military exercises with Western partners would continue outside Ukrainian territory, alongside defense-industrial cooperation and training arrangements – all without the legal obligations of membership.

“I explicitly chose ‘nonalignment’ over ‘neutrality,’” Kavanagh told Kyiv Post on Tuesday, emphasizing that Ukraine would retain defense partnerships, particularly with European states, outside a formal alliance structure.

“The reality is that Ukraine’s security model and what its armed nonalignment looks like will be specific and unique to Ukraine,” she added.

Porcupine defense

At the core of the model is a self-defense strategy built around territorial denial – often described as a “porcupine defense.”

Ukraine would focus on making any future Russian attempt to seize territory slow, costly, and unlikely to succeed.

“A nonaligned Ukraine would be responsible for its own defense,” Kavanagh wrote.

If deterrence failed, the objective would shift to attrition: denying an aggressor its goals rather than counting on rapid escalation or uncertain outside intervention.

Reassurance without promise to fight

Rather than formal security guarantees, Kavanagh advocates layered commitments from the United States and Europe – ideally codified by legislatures to make them harder to reverse.

In her Kyiv Post interview, she outlined four pillars: peacetime military aid and financing; pre-agreed surges of military and economic assistance in the event of renewed aggression, including enhanced intelligence sharing; Western-backed stockpiles of strategic weapons held outside Ukraine; and automatic “snapback” sanctions if Russia violates a settlement.

None would require a treaty obligation to fight Russia directly. Together, she argues, they would raise the costs of renewed aggression while remaining politically sustainable.

The force – and the price tag

The report estimates Ukraine would need about 235,000 active-duty troops and 345,000 reserves – a force Kavanagh described as “on the upper limit” of what the country can sustain long term, given demographic and financial constraints.

Her assessment is based on current Russian force deployments. While Moscow could attempt to expand its military, she said she is skeptical it could dedicate significantly more forces toward Ukraine while also confronting a rearming Europe.

Western assistance under the model would total roughly $41.5 billion over five years – less than $10 billion annually.

Kavanagh told Kyiv Post that the level of support is politically and industrially feasible, particularly in Europe, where leaders have framed Ukraine’s security as inseparable from their own.

“This is not a huge amount,” she said, adding that European governments have already indicated a willingness to continue support after the war.

Built for political reality

Critics argue that nonalignment has historically meant vulnerability. Kavanagh counters that some nonaligned states – including India and Vietnam – have maintained capable militaries and diversified defense partnerships.

The key, she argues, is that Ukraine’s model would be negotiated, tailored, and robust – not a return to prewar neutrality.

As Washington debates how far it can go to reassure Kyiv without triggering a confrontation with Moscow, the choice may be narrowing.

The question is no longer whether Ukraine gets NATO-style promises, but whether postwar security arrangements are built on guarantees the West cannot enforce – or on a defense strategy designed to endure shifting politics on both sides of the Atlantic.