As of February 23, 2022, Russia was considered to have one of the largest tank fleets in the world, both active and in storage. However, by early 2026, the aggressor country had not only lost this position but had also passed the point of no return, becoming a tank outsider in terms of the rate of finished tank production from scratch. Moreover, some tank manufacturing and MBT maintenance facilities may disappear altogether.

Read more about this in the material from the joint project of OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance.”

At the time of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian tank-building industry was going through a very strange phase of its existence, which could be described as imitation.

The fact is that from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, tank production in Russia suffered a massive decline . So much so that the only company capable of producing new products from scratch was Uralvagonzavod, the manufacturer of the T-72 and T-90 tanks.

In turn, Omsktransmash, the main manufacturer of T-80 tanks, by the end of the 1990s had critically lost the ability to load its production lines with new, finished products.

It’s probably worth clarifying that Uralvagonzavod, ever since the Soviet era, has sought to maintain a monopoly on main battle tank production, squashing its competitors in every way possible, while also stealing progressive ideas. Like, for example, Alexander Morozov and his T-64.

In the 1990s, this struggle for budget funds in impoverished Russia only intensified. And with its powerful lobby in the highest echelons of power, Uralvagonzavod facilitated the elimination of its competitors (in particular, Omsktransmash) – so that they would become nothing more than repair plants, incapable of participating in or producing completely new, finished products.

That is, it was precisely the lobbying and thirst for monopoly of Uralvagonzavod that led to the technical and technological degradation of tank construction in Russia.

But, as strange as it may sound, literally every quarter, half a year, or year, Russian propaganda reported that more and more new batches of T-72, T-80, and other tanks—in a wide variety of modifications—were being shipped to the Russian Armed Forces.

If, at the time of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s tank production had truly degraded to the extent I claimed above, then how did it happen that tank deliveries continued?

The Big Deception

At the outbreak of the full-scale war against Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces had approximately 3,200 combat-ready tanks of various modifications. However, more than 7,200 main battle tanks were in storage, the vast majority of which were Soviet-era tanks inherited by Russia.

The only tank that Russian factories could produce from scratch (i.e., completely new) after the 1990s was the T-90. This was a highly unsuccessful modernization of the T-72B, but it was given the green light by Boris Yeltsin himself to demonstrate to the world that modern Russia had its own new, “unparalleled” tank.

One could go on and on about how the T-90 was inherently flawed and far more vulnerable (especially in the turret) than even its now archaic ancestor, the T-72B. But in Russia, mistakes are not acknowledged, and instead they try to cover them up with shiny new packaging, or perhaps even pretentious advertising campaigns and mercenary tank biathlons.

But the fact is that the bulk of tanks supplied to the Russian Armed Forces were precisely the T-72, T-80, and sometimes even the T-62, which were classified as “new .” But, again, since the 2000s, Russian tank manufacturers have been unable to produce new tanks, with the exception of the T-90 at Uralvagonzavod. Where, then, do these other new modifications come from?

In fact, it’s simple. Russian enterprises reactivated Soviet MBT stockpiles, repaired them, modernized them, and delivered them to the troops as new equipment.

For example, the de-preservation, repair and modernization of the T-72 to the level of the T-72B3 was estimated at an average of $400 thousand until 2022, while the average price of a tank of this type is $3-4 million.

The tank was delivered as new, although in reality it had been reactivated and modernized. Sometimes, the same tank could undergo several modernization stages: for example, a T-72B3 from 2011, then 2014, 2016, and so on. And they were always recorded in the reports as “new.”

Therefore, the same tank, produced in 1982, could be put into storage, wait two decades under a layer of dust, and then be declared “new” three times as a result of successive upgrades. And with a total budget expenditure of less than $1 million, this allowed for a “sawed-off” budget of up to $10 million or more!

Thus, while simulating the production of new tanks, there has been no such production in Russia for over two decades. The only tank produced in Russia from scratch (i.e., as a completely new finished product) is the T-90 at Uralvagonzavod – at a rate of less than a company’s complement (11) per month, with an average of 6-7 MBTs.

Russia entered the war with Ukraine with no tank production, but with colossal reserves of Soviet-era main battle tanks. Reserves that, while colossal, were not endless. And within four years, they were completely depleted.

Losses and consequences

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian occupation forces have lost more than 11,700 tanks, according to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Meanwhile, verified data from monitoring groups place the ROV’s MBT losses at between 4,300 and 4,500.

It should be noted that verified data often differs from actual figures by a factor of 2-2.5 due to the impossibility of documenting all losses. Furthermore, both the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and monitoring groups’ statistics include both destroyed and damaged combat units, as well as captured ones. In other words, a tank damaged in 2022 could have been sent for repairs and returned to the battlefield in 2023, only to be destroyed. But such cases are rare.

https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/210123

To understand the number of irreparable losses, we’ll again use monitoring group data, which ranges from 3,200 to 3,500 MBTs destroyed, and multiply by a factor of 2-2.5. The result is a minimum of 6,400 or a maximum of 8,750 destroyed tanks.

Let me remind you that on the eve of the full-scale invasion, the ROV had 3,200 combat-ready tanks in service and over 7,200 in storage—or a total of 10,400. But these figures should also be interpreted in light of their recovery capabilities after long-term storage—often under extremely unfavorable conditions.

Today, most of the equipment stored outdoors at the Central Tank Reserve Bases (CTRB) is no longer in a condition suitable for restoration. In other words, during four years of full-scale war, Russian tank factories scavenged everything they could salvage. Moreover, some tank types have disappeared entirely or are on the verge of extinction.

For example, T-90A and T-90S tanks have practically disappeared from storage bases. There are no T-80U tanks, and the main combat vehicle that kept Omsktransmash afloat— the T-80BV —remains in storage at a rate of fewer than 100 units. Moreover, these tanks are not in the best repairable condition.

I am confident that 2026 will be the year of the final demise of Omsktransmash.

The situation is no better at the Russian monopoly Uralvagonzavod, which has been stifling its competitors for years. Its production line can barely produce a company-sized complement of T-90M Proryv tanks per month (as of the end of 2025). Meanwhile, restoration and modernization efforts have faced depletion of T-72B tanks and are switching to the much older T-72A.

Today, the main Russian enterprises engaged in the conditional production and restoration of tanks are:

Uralvagonzavod – restoration and modernization of the T-72. Restoration and modernization, as well as small-scale production of the T-90;

“Omsktransmash” – restoration and modernization of T-80 (not production!);

103rd Armored Repair Plant – restoration and modernization of T-62 (not production!);

61st BTRZ – restoration and modernization of T-72, T-80 (not production!);

163rd BTRZ – restoration and modernization of T-72 (not production!).

In the near future, some of them will shut down due to an inability to fulfill orders, as they lack the necessary materials. Omsktransmash will be one of the first to fully experience the crisis. Then, by 2026-2027, the capacity of other enterprises will be completely exhausted .

The war in Ukraine has killed Russian tank production, which had previously been successfully destroyed by self-serving Russian monopolies and which will never be revived or return to the level of February 23, 2022. The combination of factors that accumulated after the collapse of the USSR led not only to the degradation but also to the inevitable demise of this industry in the Russian Federation.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/poteri-rossii-v-vojne-protiv-ukrainyi-na-utro-8-marta-2026.htm