03/16/2026
Ukraine carries out successful strikes on a wide range of Russian targets every day: from oil refineries that play an important role in ensuring the Russian budget (focused on the war with Ukraine) to strategically important enterprises that have proven completely unprotected against both kamikaze drones and missile attacks. For example, just a few days ago, a precision strike was carried out on the Silicon El Group microelectronics plant in Bryansk, and before that, on a missile manufacturing plant in Votkinsk.
Against this background, the Russians have a question – where is the air defense?
More details about this can be found in the material of the joint project OBOZ.UA and the group “Information Resistance”.
Depletion of Russian air defense
It was impossible to imagine such a scale of strikes, the destruction of critically important objects and, importantly, constant breakthroughs of Russian echeloned air defense in 2022, 2023 and even 2024. In turn, the success of all these operations is not only the result of careful planning, scaling up the production and use of strike weapons, but also long, painstaking work on the depletion of Russian air defense, which as of today has lost its function of protecting the airspace of the Russian Federation.
From the very beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian occupiers, Ukraine chose a strategy of war of attrition. In the fall of 2023, it became fundamental in the actions of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. And this depletion concerned not only the Russian tank potential, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and even human and economic resources. It also concerned something that is not often mentioned, but which plays an important role both on the front line and in the deep rear – air defense.
According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian troops have lost more than 1,330 air defense units.
The nuance of providing this information is that it does not specify the types of destroyed air defense systems, there is no separate data on radars and other radar systems, and there is no division into categories of destroyed/damaged/captured.
In turn, monitoring groups that calculate DOM losses based on verified data (photos/video) provide the following data:
total losses amounted to over 580;
anti-aircraft guns – over 70;
self-propelled anti-aircraft guns – over 30;
SAM – over 370;
Radars and other radars – over 120.
For those who are still not aware and who continue to be confused by the discrepancy between the official data of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and verified data, on average, the difference between documented statistics has a coefficient of 2-2.5, from which we conclude that the official information is quite reliable.
And now in detail about the losses by name:
ZU-23-2 – over 45 units;
ZAK S-60 – more than 5 units;
ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” – over 10;
BTR-3D “Skrezhet” – more than 5;
2K22 “Tunguska” – over 16;
SAM 9K33 “Osa” – over 40;
SAM 9K35 “Strela-10” – over 50;
Buk-M1/2/3 air defense systems – over 140;
“Tor-M1/2” air defense system – over 75;
“Pantsir-S1” air defense missile system – over 50;
S-300/400 air defense systems – over 50.
And now, to simplify the task, we multiply all these verified data given above by 2-2.5 and get, for example, that the net losses of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system may exceed 125 units, while before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there were 116 of them on combat duty in the Russian Federation. At the same time, the production of Pantsir-S1 is 1-2 complexes per month or, relatively speaking, 12-24 per year.
Thus, in the best case scenario, the Russian Federation may now have up to 100 Pantsir-S1 air defense systems on combat duty, which is less than at the beginning of 2022. This number is critically lacking – taking into account the need for these complexes at the front and to cover the airspace of the Russian Federation itself.
If we consider the Buk-M1/2/3 air defense systems according to the same scheme, we get a net loss of 350. Despite the fact that before the full-scale invasion, there were… 350 Buks on combat duty in the Russian Federation! The production potential per year is from 15 to 30 complexes. That is, in the best case scenario, the Russian Federation produced 120 air defense systems of this type in four years, which is even more catastrophic than the Pantsir-S1 air defense system.
In general, such a calculation can be applied to each category and roughly understand the scale of depletion of Russian air defense today. Of course, someone can say about relative accuracy and a certain theoreticality, which I cannot but agree with. But if this theory were not supported by real facts – the increase in white spots and gaps in the airspace of the Russian Federation, then I probably would not present it here. But this is not so.
Although the most attentive, I’m sure, have noticed that I haven’t touched on the topic of radar yet.
Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where are the radars?
The radar station is the most important component of any air defense system. We like to watch the S-300 and S-400 launchers burn, the enemy ammunition detonate, but no less important and perhaps even the most important thing is the destruction of radar systems.
According to verified data, over 120 Russian radars and radars were destroyed/damaged/captured during the four years of full-scale war. Ukraine focused on destroying Russian radar stations in the most closed, positional area possible – on the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula.
Today, Crimea has become a trap for Russian air defense, where a real hunt has been arranged for it on an extremely inconvenient piece of land for defense. Every week, the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, etc. report on the successful defeats on the peninsula of such complexes as the “Pidlit” radar, the “Niobiy-SV” radar, the “Kasta 2E2” radar, the “Imbyr” radar, the “Nebo-SV”/”Nebo-M” radar, the 59N6-E “Protyvnik-GE” radar and many others.
https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/213744
It is worth noting that not even the destruction, but only the damage to such radars, especially their antennas and radars, puts the entire complex out of service. Such a radar must be urgently replaced with another, otherwise the air defense system becomes blind and unable to effectively perform its functions.
For example, the 96L6E is destroyed/damaged, the target designation radar (all-altitude detector) is destroyed – and that’s it, the S-300/S-400 division and even the S-300/S-400 regiment is deaf and blind. The S-400 “Triumph” air defense systems, which “have no analogues in the world,” are turning into a pile of unnecessary scrap metal. A new radar needs to be urgently pulled in. And where to get it, this “new” one, if only a few units are produced per year ? There’s no need to wait for the plant to release new finished products, and therefore they are being removed from the already existing, deployed S-300/S-400 divisions/regiments in the rear area of the Russian Federation.
And this principle has been working in a circle for several weeks, months, and years, turning Crimea into a meat grinder for the Russian air defense, and for Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, into a real shooting range for shooting down enemy air defense systems.
But the hunt for Russian air defense is being conducted not only in occupied Crimea, but throughout the entire combat zone – including directly on the territory of the Russian Federation.
For example, on the night of March 1, 2026, Ukrainian drones attacked S-400 air defense system positions near the village of Osynova Gora, Tula Region, seriously damaging the 92N6A radar.
And on the night of February 7, our strike drones hit the 96L6 radar near the village of Trykovka, Bryansk region.
And on December 14, 2025, a raid was carried out on a S-400 air defense system column near the village of Rayivka, Belgorod region, as a result of which the S-400 5P85SM2-01 launcher and a loading vehicle with 48N6DM missile ammunition were destroyed and damaged.
In fact, as of the beginning of 2026, Russian air defense has been brought to such a state that it is not only incapable of protecting Russian airspace, but also itself. The same case when the hunter turned into prey.
The demilitarization and denazification of the Russian army is proceeding strictly according to plan.