The oil foundation is beginning to sag noticeably.
10.02.2026
The Russian war is not based on ideology and propaganda of “rising from the knees”. Its real basis is money. As long as the mafia regime in Moscow retains access to oil revenues, it is able to finance aggression, compensate for military losses and maintain the internal loyalty of the elites. But this very foundation is now beginning to sag noticeably.
The black market for Russian oil, which the Kremlin has for years touted as proof of its “stability” and ability to circumvent sanctions, is under serious threat. Millions of barrels are stuck in storage, and the reason for this is not only new restrictions from the US and Europe (arrests of tankers from Russia’s “shadow fleet” are already becoming commonplace). As Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas notes, the key factor is much more pragmatic: complying with the rules has become cheaper and safer than breaking them.
For buyers of sanctioned oil – primarily India and Turkey – legal alternatives are now available at reasonable prices and without serious political risks. Over the past two months, these countries have started switching to oil that is not subject to restrictions without much difficulty. As a result, Russian supplies are losing their attractiveness, and the former model of over-discounts is no longer working. The mafia economy, accustomed to making money on gray schemes, is facing banal market logic.
The situation is similar for Iran. Its exports are almost entirely tied to China, which today buys about 95% of Iranian oil and about 60% of Russian oil. This relationship seems mutually beneficial, but in fact it only increases the dependence of Moscow and Tehran on the center of decision-making. China gets cheap energy and powerful political leverage, and dictatorships have less and less room to maneuver.
Beijing could theoretically compensate for the volumes India and Turkey are giving up by diverting sanctioned oil into strategic reserves. But even in this scenario, Russia and Iran find themselves hostages rather than beneficiaries. Their revenues are transformed from an instrument of external control into a source of sovereign power. The alternative is even more painful: production cuts and a direct blow to budgets, which are already under serious pressure.
India’s reversal is also indicative. The country’s largest refiners – Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Reliance Industries – have refused new purchases of Russian crude for March and April. According to Reuters, New Delhi may refrain from Russian supplies further, seeing it as part of a strategy of rapprochement with the United States. For the Kremlin, this means the loss of one of its key markets and another signal: the world is gradually learning to do without mafia suppliers.
The hole in Russia’s budget was already noticeably deeper this January than it was a year ago. And all trends indicate that it is not going to get any better. The military economy is demanding more and more resources, and sources to replenish them are becoming increasingly scarce. The illusion of financial invulnerability is being dispelled.
It is important to understand: for the mafia system, financial flows are not just a source of income, but a control mechanism. Money ensures the loyalty of the elites, the work of the repressive apparatus and relative social calm inside the country. As long as oil was sold – albeit at a discount, through gray schemes and intermediaries – the regime could compensate for military failures and postpone retribution for the future. Now this room for maneuver is rapidly shrinking.
The decline in oil revenues affects several levels of the system at once. First, the resource for continued warfare – not only in the military but also in the political dimension – is diminishing. Second, competition within the elite itself for access to money flows intensifies. And third, there is growing dependence on external players, primarily China, which in this configuration ceases to be a partner and becomes an arbiter.
This is an important point. A mafia state can exist only in conditions of relative autonomy of its shadow revenues. As soon as control over them shifts outward, the system loses its stability. Russia earns less and less from oil and sells its own dependence more and more – agreeing to terms that would have been considered unacceptable just a few years ago.
Modern Russia is neither an energy superpower nor a “geopolitical guarantor.” It is a mafia system built around shadow flows, “gray flotillas” and constant circumvention of rules. It offers no partners development, security or technology. It sells risk – and that’s a commodity that’s getting worse.
This is exactly what the book “Mafia State: How Russia Failed to Become Democratic”, which I edited, says in detail. It demonstrates how criminal practices have been built into the very fabric of the state, how the shadow economy has become a pillar of the regime’s political stability, and how dependence on illegal revenues has become its main vulnerability.
Today, the fight against the revenues of the mafia regime comes to the fore. It is not loud statements or symbolic gestures, but the systemic cutting off of financial flows that is undermining the Kremlin’s ability to wage war. Every alternative to sanctioned oil, every rejection of gray schemes, every additional risk for intermediaries weakens this construction.
For a mafia state, this is always a critical moment. Because without money neither war, nor repression, nor the myth of their own power work. And that is why strikes on the financial foundation of the regime are much more effective than any declarations.
https://charter97.org/en/news/2026/2/10/673209