And paradoxically this will be exactly what Europe needs

CEMIL KERIMOGLU

MAR 22, 2026

It is a thankless task to make predictions, but I will make one here: Russia will attack Europe this year, specifically targeting the Baltic states.

Russia recently introduced a draft law permitting the deployment of its troops for the defense of Russians abroad. For any keen observer familiar with Russian tactics, this signals a clear willingness to invade foreign sovereign nations – and they are actively laying the legal groundwork to justify it.

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Given the specific emphasis on protecting “Russians abroad”, the implication heavily points toward the Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. Corroborating this thesis, there has been a recent surge in activityon social media channels discussing the “Narva People’s Republic” and pushing the narrative that Russians are “suffering” under Estonian rule. Taken together, these developments suggest a Russian attack is imminent.

Skeptics might counter this prediction. They will point out that unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, protected by the Article 5 mutual defense clause. Russia, they will argue, would not dare risk a direct war with NATO. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in particular might cling to the hope that their NATO membership guarantees bulletproof security.

But they would be gravely mistaken. Ultimately, NATO’s Article 5 is merely an agreement, and abiding by any agreement is, first and foremost, a moral decision. Consider this: deciding whether to defend Ukraine against a barbaric Russian invasion was also a moral decision. Those who argued against coming to the rescue of a fellow European nation facing existential destruction – citing arguments that Ukraine is not in NATO, or that the West must not risk a “confrontation” or a “nuclear war” with Russia – were essentially taking an immoral stance. The choice to abandon an innocent victim to a savage aggressor is a moral failure and speaks to the inherent immorality of its proponents.

Now, imagine this scenario: do you truly expect the same people who refused to adequately protect Ukraine or accept it into NATO – out of fear of Russia’s nuclear arsenal – to suddenly abide by the agreement enshrined in Article 5? In other words, why should you expect the people who have already demonstrated their inherent moral corruption by taking one immoral stance, not to take another immoral stance? What is to prevent them from using the exact same perverse immoral logic, claiming that “honoring Article 5 is not worth triggering a nuclear confrontation”? Why assume that people who have already justified abandoning a fellow European nation to brutal genocide will magically honor a contract for another? Article 5 is not a magic wand that guarantees protection. On its own, it does not make NATO members intrinsically more secure against invasion than non-NATO members; its implementation is entirely dependent on the moral compass of people bound by it. As the response to Ukraine demonstrated, moral resolve is sorely lacking among many European policymakers. That is the real risk.

Opponents might present a second argument: Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. They will claim that Russia has depleted its resources and simply cannot afford to open a second front. If Russia cannot defeat Ukraine, the logic goes, how could it possibly take on NATO?

This logic is flawed for several interconnected reasons. First, as previously argued, NATO might hesitate to intervene, or fail to show up at all. More importantly, even if NATO were to mobilize, Putin might think differently. He might well believe that NATO is unlikely to intervene and that occupying the Baltic states would be a walk in the park. And from a strictly military standpoint, he might be right; the Baltic countries are significantly smaller and less militarily prepared than Ukraine. Just because Russia stumbled in Ukraine does not guarantee it will stumble in the Baltics.

Furthermore, while Russia has been unable to defeat Ukraine – partly because Ukraine adapted exceptionally well to the realities of modern combat – Russia has adapted, too. It may not have become stronger than Ukraine, but it could very well have surpassed NATO armies in certain critical domains, specifically drone warfare. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states and the broader NATO alliance currently seem ill-prepared for this new paradigm of war. Russia, battle-tested by its experience in Ukraine, is well-prepared. Putin likely believes that while he cannot overpower Ukraine, he can certainly overpower the Baltics.

Finally, the fact that Russia is failing in Ukraine is not a reason for it not to open a second front; paradoxically, that very failure might be the exact justification for Russia to do so. On a tactical level, the Baltics appear like easier prey. But also on a deeper psychological level, let’s look at it from Putin’s perspective. If he is losing in Ukraine – a non-NATO country – expanding the war to attack NATO directly could frame a potential defeat as more honorable and excusable. Full-scale confrontation with NATO would make the devastating hardships of war easier for the Russian public to digest. By attacking NATO countries – and predictably framing it as a “defensive” war – Putin can more convincingly claim that the “satanic” West has united against Russia, and that the country is fighting for its very survival. This propaganda trick could finally be used to justify full domestic mobilization. It would no longer be a “special military operation”, but an open full-scale holy waragainst the “evil West”.

Furthermore, Russia may not even need to launch a full-scale conventional invasion. It can simply replicate its 2014 Donbas playbook. By dispatching operatives and military personnel to cities like Narva or Daugavpils – while simultaneously activating pre-existing intelligence networks – Moscow can manufacture a crisis. They will rely on the same manipulative narrative utilized in Ukraine and throughout Russian history: framing an orchestrated destabilization campaign as an organic, grassroots uprising of ethnic Russians fighting for their rights against “oppressive” Estonian and Latvian governments. This is the standard Russian modus operandi: completely inverting the roles of victim and perpetrator, and disguising their invasion as a domestic “civil war”.

Shockingly, when this tactic was deployed in the Donbas, much of the West swallowed the narrative. What began in eastern Ukraine in 2014 was by no means an organic uprising; it was a Russian invasion cloaked as an internal conflict, facilitated by local collaborators long cultivated by the FSB.

This type of geopolitical manipulation closely mirrors the psychological dynamics of personal abuse. The abuser strikes, then outright denies the attack ever happened. By feeding the victim a barrage of absurdities that contradict reality, the abuser slowly forces the victim to doubt their own sanity. Was I really hurt? Am I overreacting? Is this my fault?

This is precisely how Russians treated Ukraine for years prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion. They annexed Crimea and called it a “spontaneous uprising”. They invaded the Donbas and labeled it a “civil war”. Even as Russian operatives, weapons, and troops poured across the border, Moscow flatly denied any involvement. The true danger of this manipulation is that it corrodes a nation’s sense of reality. It leaves victims and their allies paralyzed, wondering if their outrage is even justified. Ukrainians were subjected to this exact abuse: invaded, and then gaslit into wondering whether they were imagining it.

Russia is highly likely to attempt this exact strategy in the Baltic states: invade, then deny it. This exposes NATO’s greatest vulnerability. A hybrid, manipulative invasion of this nature will trap the Alliance in endless, futile debates over whether an “actual” attack has occurred, effectively stalling the invocation of Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia will rely on its allies and useful idiots in the West – figures like Viktor Orbán or Robert Fico – to amplify its narrative. They will argue that unrest in Narva is a purely internal Estonian matter, that the rights of the Russian minority are being trampled, and that an “evil, warmongering EU” is aggressively provoking Russia. Ultimately, they will argue that Russia is the true victim and deserves to be heard.

Furthermore, Russia will find eager sympathizers among Western leftists. Moscow will peddle the notion of infringed minority rights, painting a picture of “poor” Russians being abused by “fascist” Baltic governments. Here again, the victim and perpetrator are inverted. It must be clearly understood: current Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states are descendants of Russian invaders. The very invaders who have raped, murdered and tortured Baltic people, pillaged their towns and then settled in those conquered lands. Or in other cases descendants of Russians who were deliberately resettled into those conquered countries by the Soviet government in order to dilute the proportion of the native population – an act of ethnic replacement.

However Russian propaganda presents the Russians in the Baltic states as some kind of indigenous inhabitants whose customs and language must be respected. In reality, however, they are the descendants of the very perpetrators against the actual indigenous populations. They were resettled there to deprive the native Baltic peoples of their rights and freedoms. Upon regaining independence, the Baltic states would have been entirely justified in treating them as colonizers who bear the demographic and moral legacy of their ancestors’ crimes, and expelling them. Instead, the Baltic nations exercised remarkable restraint, asking only that these populations integrate, learn the national languages, and abandon their allegiance to the Soviet past.

Yet, from the very beginning, Russian propaganda weaponized these civilized integration efforts, framing them as “suppression” and “fascism”. Unfortunately, this deceitful framing often finds fertile ground in the West, ignoring the fact that Estonians and Latvians are the historical victims, whereas the Russian populations in those states are the actual perpetrators.

Ultimately, these manipulative tactics are designed to slowly erode Europe’s resilience. By employing this strategy, Russia can gradually destabilize the continent and absorb territory after territory without Europe ever officially admitting it has been attacked. Stripped of a clear-cut justification to respond to Russian aggression, Europe will remain paralyzed – first and foremost morally – trapped in a cycle of self-doubt, wondering if the Baltic peoples are somehow to blame and if the Russians are not entirely guilty.

Europe’s actions must therefore be swift, unapologetic, and bold. There is no time for endless deliberations or clumsy bureaucratic procedures. Crucially, the requirement for unanimity – which ought to be abolished regardless – must be bypassed so that bad-faith actors like Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico cannot thwart joint European efforts.

European nations must stop relying on NATO. Trump’s America will not come to the rescue of the Baltic states; it will never antagonize Russia. Europe is on its own. Furthermore, waiting for an EU-wide consensus would be a fatal error, as it would mire the war effort in futile negotiations. Instead, a separate coalition of NATO and EU members alongside Ukraine must emerge that will operate independently of these cumbersome institutional structures.

A core, rapid-response alliance must be forged immediately between the Baltic states, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and the Nordic countries, with Germany, France, and the UK likely joining the fold. The objective of this alliance must not be merely to defend a European country at the specific time and place of a Russian attack. Its explicit aim must be to take the fight to Russian soil the moment Moscow escalates.

For too long, Europe has trapped itself in a purely defensive posture – a strategic blunder that has cost it dearly and resulted in squandered opportunities. A strictly defensive mindset, paralyzed by the fear of “escalation”, guarantees defeat before the battle even begins. This mindset must be abandoned. The moment Russia escalates – whether through a direct invasion or by inciting local proxies to declare a “Narva People’s Republic” or a “Daugavpils People’s Republic” – this European coalition must strike Russia in response. Without hesitation. Without pathetic fears of “escalation”. Without going into endless paralyzing debates about whether Europe was really attacked by Russia.

This offensive can take several forms. First, the European alliance should be prepared to cross into Russian territory. For instance, Russia shares a massive, largely unprotected border with Finland. Moscow has felt so confident in its western flank that it freely relocated troops and resources to Ukraine. Russia must be stripped of this comfort; it is strategically absurd to allow it. Any destabilization in Estonia or Latvia must be immediately recognized as a 100% Russian act of war triggering a direct incursion into Russian territory, whether from Finland, from Poland and Lithuania toward Kaliningrad, or into Belarus, which essentially functions as a Russian-occupied territory.

Additionally – and not mutually exclusive with ground operations – Europe must be prepared to strike Moscow and other critical Russian targets using long-range weaponry, such as Taurus missiles. The alliance should also leverage Ukraine’s highly advanced drone technology. Drones should launch toward Russia not only from Ukraine, but from the Baltics, Finland, Poland, and beyond. After all, Russia routinely fires missiles and drones at Ukraine, not only from its own but also from Belarusian territory. Russia must not be allowed to feel safe. The Russian populace and leadership must lose the arrogant assumption that they can bomb Europe from the absolute safety of their own borders without facing the exact same devastation at home.

Why is it that Russia is permitted to bomb European cities – currently in Ukraine, and quite possibly in other nations soon – while Europe remains psychologically paralyzed, terrified of striking back at Russia? Such a state of affairs is unacceptable.

Europe has already missed golden opportunities to crush Russia simply due to its over-reliance on NATO consensus and American leadership. For example, while Russia was deeply bogged down in Ukraine, Poland could have decisively intervened in Belarus. This would have been a masterstroke, permanently tilting the balance of power in Europe’s favor. But Poland could not act alone; it was constrained by the expectation of US and NATO approval. By outsourcing their military decisions to NATO, individual European nations have surrendered their freedom of action. Why is it acceptable for Russia to attack Europe, but utterly taboo for Europe to attack Russia? It is strategic insanity. This timid, subservient stance must finally come to an end.

Europe has faced barbarian invasions in the past, and each time, it has emerged triumphant. At pivotal moments in history, Europeans have managed to set aside their differences, make swift, effective decisions, and not only defend themselves but utterly defeat their invaders. The last time Europe faced a predicament of this magnitude was during the Ottoman expansion. At the end of the 17th century, Turks stood at the gates of Vienna. But Europeans united; they not only repelled the assault on the city but pressed forward into occupied territory, eventually driving the Turks out of Central Europe and permanently crippling their offensive capabilities.

Today’s Russian threat mirrors the Ottoman menace of centuries past. The Siege of Vienna ultimately catalyzed Europe’s rebirth, ushering in an era of unprecedented greatness and global influence. The same must happen with the Russian threat. Yes, Russia will attack Europe – and in a grim sense, this will be exactly what Europe needs. It will finally force the continent to unite and fight. The goal must not merely be to repel a Russian attack, but to crush and dismantle Russia for good. In this context, the Russian siege of Kyiv in 2022 will go down in history as Russia’s “Vienna 1683“ moment.

Dismantling Russia through a unified European effort – spurred by the stark realization that there is no alternative but to fight – will be more than a geopolitical victory. It will be a moment of profound psychological cleansing for European civilization. For too long, particularly since the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia has distorted the European consciousness. The very existence of Russia has acted as a continuous abuse on the European psyche, serving as the primary cultural disruptor of Europe and the West at large. Therefore, for European civilization to reach new heights, Russia must be fundamentally eliminated and dismantled.

This dismantling will usher in a new Golden Age for Europe. On a deeper level, it will liberate the European consciousness, ending many decades of psychological distortion. It will ignite a modern Age of Discovery, opening up the vast Eurasian expanse – which has long remained obscured to global awareness behind imperial Russian rule – to true rediscovery and deeper understanding. Europe’s ultimate destiny lies in disintegrating Russia into dozens of independent states with their own regional/national identities that disavow their “Russian” past and administering that vast Eurasian space. Then, and only then, will Europe reach its full potential. Then, and only then, will Europe be great… again.

© 2026 Cemil Kerimoglu

Comment from :

World War II – Epic Battles

What a coincidence we both posted articles about defensive strategy.

Cemil Kerimoglu 

Because our thoughts are timely and spot on.

World War II – Epic Battles

Dude, I’m not even kidding now, for the fifth year I can barely rest at night, thinking about everything that’s happening in Ukraine. My soul is at the front with every Ukrainian defender and especially the friends I have there. Every night I go to bed thinking about how we can kill more of those russian criminals and every morning when I wake up I’m thinking the same.

Cemil Kerimoglu 

The same with me. Thank you for all the work you are doing. We will win. Europe will prevail. Russia will be destroyed. Demilitarized, denuclearized and disintegrated into dozens of independent states.

Paul Stone 

Agree that Europe must form an alliance exclusive of the unreliable/adversarial United States (I’m an American).

Kök Böri

How can Russia be defeated, when its population, like in any another Asian country, is not afraid of death? The life of common people in provincial Russia was artificially made so bad, that the life is not worth living, but to go to war means to get money, and to die in war means much more money. Who of Europeans with their comfortable life would do so? They just surrender to save themselves and their properties.

Well, I think when the conflict of Russia and Europe will be seriously “hot”, it will be just one more conventional war (with hybrid elements), and in result of it Russian forces will be on the Channel in three months after the start of this war. One month later they will be in Gibraltar.

Not because the Europeans do not have enough weapons (yes, they do not have, but this is not the point), but because they simply surrender. No one of European rulers, with all their follies and blunders, with all their ideological delusions (like democracy, tolerance, freedoms, human rights, and another Freemasonic bullshit) do not want to have their cities destroyed and their citizens dead. Moreover, the peoples of France, Germany, Italy, Spain will welcome Russians with flowers as liberators of “Jewish-AngloSaxon yoke”.

You know, there is a big difference between European ruling elites and Ukrainian rulers. European elites are not good. But at least they are responsible before THEIR peoples. They are elected by THEIR peoples. They live of taxes of THEIR peoples. So they have some responsibility and accountability. They know that their “subjects” will not forgive them, when they meddle in a war in some far Baltic republic, if it brings danger of their own destruction. “Mourir pour Danzig?”, as the French said in 1939.

In Ukraine the situation is different. Ukrainian rulers are mostly not ethnical Ukrainians, and who is, always has children, wives, money, relatives, properties, etc. in the West. They are puppets of the UK and also of the EU. The joke “London is the capital of UKraine” has more truth in, than it seems. They are not elected, because the elections are abandoned. They live not so much of the Ukrainian taxes, but of European and British money. So they are responsible and accountable not before Ukrainians, but before EU/UK. Ukraine of today is British and European semi-colony, without real sovereignity, and Ukrainians are just a cannon fodder of the British. There are no freedom of speech in Ukraine, and that’s why nobody dares to speak about some kind of agreement with Russia, just to stop murders and destructions. For Europeans Ukrainian lives do not matter, and “Ukrainian” rulers are much more dependent on Europe, than on own people, and they are already ready to flee to London/Miami/Jerusalem. Dead Ukrainians will be simply replaced by 10 to 12 millions of Bengali brownies, which will work for a bowl of rice for Western partners.

Ukrainians cannot change the situation, because they are held hostage by a crank regime, which lied so long to its population, to the world, and to itself, that it now believes itself in its lies, like “coffee in Yalta”, “borders of 1991” and another delusions. Ukrainians do not fight, because they WANT. They fight, because nobody allows them to stop fighting. The bloody revenge of Circassian Jihadist “Boris Johnson”, but fought by proxy, should go on, to make Russia bleed out. If Ukrainians have had some sovereignity, the war would be finished in the Spring of 2022.

Hans Boserup, Dr.jur. 🇩🇰 

The claim that a Russian attack on NATO is *imminent this year* does not sit well with Russia’s current operational reality

Cemil, there is a sharp and valuable warning in your piece — particularly on hybrid tactics, narrative warfare, and the danger of ambiguity in the Baltic context. Those are real vulnerabilities, and Ukraine has already shown how effective Russia can be in exploiting hesitation.

That said, your argument overreaches in ways that risk obscuring rather than clarifying the strategic picture.

First, the claim that a Russian attack on NATO is *imminent this year* does not sit well with Russia’s current operational reality. What we are observing in Ukraine is not a military with surplus capacity looking for a second front, but one operating at the edge of its **sustainable force-generation cycle**. Even if Russia has adapted in drones and strike systems, its ground forces remain tied to a high-cost attritional model. Opening a direct confrontation with NATO — even a limited one — would introduce escalation risks that Moscow has consistently tried to avoid, not embrace.

Second, reducing Article 5 to a purely “moral choice” misses the structural point. NATO is not Ukraine. It is not a question of goodwill alone, but of **institutionalised deterrence backed by forward deployments, integrated command structures, and automatic political signalling mechanisms**. That does not make it foolproof — ambiguity in a hybrid scenario is a real issue — but it does make it fundamentally different from the discretionary support model we saw with Ukraine.

Where your argument is strongest is on the *grey-zone pathway*: Narva-type scenarios, manufactured unrest, and narrative contestation. That is precisely where Russia can probe — not because NATO would not respond to a clear attack, but because Moscow will try to **avoid triggering a clear attack threshold altogether**.

However, this leads to a different conclusion than the one you draw.

The key risk is not that Europe will “do nothing” out of moral failure. It is that Europe may respond **too slowly or too ambiguously in the early phase**, allowing faits accomplis to form in the information and political domain before military clarity is established. That is a problem of *decision latency*, not civilisational collapse.

Finally, the call to “dismantle Russia” and conduct immediate offensive operations into Russian territory is strategically counterproductive. It collapses deterrence into escalation and plays directly into the narrative architecture the Kremlin relies on: a defensive war against an existential Western threat. In other words, it risks giving Moscow exactly the mobilisation logic it currently lacks.

If anything, Ukraine and the Gulf crisis point to a different framework — one you implicitly touch on but do not fully develop:

This is a contest of **endurance versus metabolism**.

Russia (and Iran, in parallel) operates on endurance: the ability to absorb losses, stretch ambiguity, and exploit hesitation over time.

The West operates on metabolism: faster decision cycles, tighter integration, and the ability to translate information into action quickly.

The Baltic question will be decided not by who is more “moral,” but by **who can recognise and act on ambiguity first**.

So yes — Europe should take the hybrid threat extremely seriously, and your warning on Narva-style scenarios is well placed.

But the most dangerous mistake is not underestimating Russia.

It is **misdiagnosing the problem as moral weakness instead of temporal friction** — and then prescribing escalation as the cure.

Len Layton 

And the Finns will be more than happy to take back Karelia!