5.03.2026

Recently, Ukrainian attack drones carried out a raid on the Pugachevka airfield in Russia’s Oryol region. As a result, enemy combat equipment—Mi-8 and Ka-52 helicopters worth over $30 million—was destroyed. The successful operation by the Ukrainian Defense Forces also exposed a serious problem with Russian aviation.

When we talk about successful SAM strikes against Russian rear-area targets, we most often cite the depletion of enemy air defenses as one of the reasons for the effectiveness of these recent operations . And this, of course, is true.

Over the course of four years of full-scale war, Russian short-, medium-, and long-range air defense systems were destroyed and damaged in quantities that the Russian military-industrial complex will never be able to compensate for.

According to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian army has lost more than 1,300 air defense systems in four years. According to monitoring groups that maintain statistics based on verified data (photo and video evidence), the figure is more than 600. Given the average ratio of real to verified data of 1 to 2/2.5, the data published by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on enemy losses is highly reliable.

But in reality, such losses aren’t the only reason why SAMs are increasingly able to catch Russian aircraft on the ground. Another factor is also significant.

When air raid sirens sound in Russian regions and air defense systems transmit information about the flight path of attack drones clearly headed for a particular airfield, there is simply no one to scramble the aircraft stationed there to protect them from attack.

Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where are the pilots?

On the night of February 20, Ukrainian attack drones raided the Pugachevka airfield in the Oryol region. The airfield is owned by the local DOSAAF flying club and has an unpaved runway. Nevertheless, it housed military transport and combat aircraft, including Mi-8 and Ka-52 helicopters.

The airfield itself is located at least 160 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and frankly, the Russian military knew about the danger of attack drones even before the first UAVs crossed Russian airspace. In theory, if pilots had been on duty at Pugachevka Airfield, an hour would have been enough to scramble the aircraft and divert them from the attack.

But there were no pilots on duty.

To understand the criticality of the situation in which the Russian Aerospace Forces find themselves, we must return once again to the losses of the Russian Air Force over four years of full-scale war – in terms of aviation.

Losses of ROV aviation

Let’s start, as usual, with data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding the losses of the Russian Aerospace Forces over four years – 435 aircraft and 348 helicopters.

The problem with maintaining statistics and analyzing ROV losses based on data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is that they are simply statements of losses, without further clarification—destroyed in the air/on the ground, damaged in the air/on the ground, captured… Yes, there were some trophies, too. At least one Ka-52 and a Mi-8AMTSh, in case anyone has forgotten.

Monitoring groups, in turn, provide the following figures: over 180 aircraft and approximately 170 helicopters. Considering the ratio of actual to verified data of 1 to 2/2.5, it can be concluded that the data from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is reliable.

But the most interesting question is: how many Russian pilots were killed when a combat aircraft or helicopter was lost? What are the losses in this particular segment, which can only be roughly systematized through open-source publications or other means.

But here I want to note that the more or less confirmed losses of Russian Aerospace Forces pilots for combat aircraft amount to between 80 and 110, and for attack and transport helicopters, pay attention, more than 150!

That is, roughly speaking, the total losses of Russian pilots over the four years since the start of the full-scale invasion amounted to more than 260 people!

And I’m not even taking into account the various emergencies that have occurred with Russian aviation over these four years, directly on the territory of the aggressor country, during which Russian pilots have died.

https://t.me/uaobozrevatel/168507

Crisis

At the time of the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces had more than 1,300 combat aircraft in relatively combat-ready, airworthy condition, including strategic aviation, as well as more than 1,700 helicopters – both transport and combat, and directly attack.

Every year, Russian universities steadily graduated up to 150 pilots, of whom an average of 70-100 chose combat specialization. The main training ground for future Russian pilots is the Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots (KVVAUL).

Considering the average production rate of up to 30 combat aircraft per year and approximately the same number of helicopters, the Russian Aerospace Forces were quite sufficient to generate future pilots with their production capacity.

But an important aspect is that graduates aren’t immediately considered aces. Furthermore, they must spend at least two to three years flying before being able to pilot solo, without supervision. A true professional, or ace, is considered a pilot who has spent up to 10 years at the controls alone.

Furthermore, a number of other factors must be taken into account. Specifically, the retirement of experienced pilots while aircraft production continues and the number of graduates remains unchanged. Also, when considering the number of graduates, it’s important to remember that helicopter crews are often paired, as is the case with some combat aircraft, such as the Su-34.

Now let’s outline the picture of reality.

Russian aircraft continue to regularly carry out terrorist missions against Ukraine, but at a distance. Su-34 frontline bombers launch hundreds or more of these missiles daily, attack helicopters pitch up to fire on SAM positions, and at night, they intercept Ukrainian attack drones—the only demonstrably effective means of interception.

But there aren’t enough crews on duty for all the aircraft— so that all the planes and helicopters that are within range of Ukrainian strikes have a 24-hour pilot who can lift them off and take them away from the potential strike zone.

There simply aren’t enough pilots to bomb Ukraine all day, in eight-hour shifts, and then hand over the aircraft for maintenance, leaving the next crew to take their turn. So, three eight-hour shifts, or two 12-hour shifts, are required. Helicopter crews are a particular problem—they need twice as many, especially when the same Ka-52 needs to be used for both forward-facing missions in nose-up mode and drone interception at night.

Incidentally, Russian helicopters have recently been more frequently hit on the ground or crashed than other combat aircraft. And in the latter case, the problem is not so much the technical condition of the aircraft, although that does occur, but rather the wear and tear of the pilot’s physical capabilities.

And, importantly, this problem is insoluble under current conditions. Russia won’t be able to quickly and efficiently produce new pilots, but the number of aircraft that will never fly again… will continue to grow.

https://war.obozrevatel.com/rossii-ne-hvataet-pilotov-chtobyi-spasti-boevuyu-aviatsiyu-ot-udarov-po-aerodromam-v-chem-prichina-i-kakie-poteri-u-vraga.htm